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PUMPING WITH THE INTENT TO KILL: EVADING
WETLANDS JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 404 OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT THROUGH DRAINING
INTRODUCTION
Wetlands have often been perceived as nuisances of the highest order. The
Supreme Court blamed wetlands for contaminated water sources and a host of
maladies, including malarial and malignant fevers.' Even George Washington
expressed contempt for the nation's wetlands through his membership of the
Dismal Swamp Company,' which was established to drain 40,000 acres of the
Great Dismal Swamp so that prime timber could be cut.8 Additionally, Con-
gress, in the 1800s, promulgated such laws as the Swamp Wetland Acts,
which effectively granted the states sixty-five million acres of federal wetlands
for draining and reclamation.'
In the last thirty years, however, the general consensus about wetlands has
changed dramatically.' For many in the United States, wetlands are now con-
sidered "liquid assets," and their conservation is viewed as the single most
important environmental issue confronting the nation.' Such a shift in opinion
I. See G. Mitchell & J. Chafee, Foreword, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 217 (1988) (quoting
Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1899), where the Supreme Court stated, "If there is
any fact which may be supposed to be known by everybody ...it is that swamps and stagnant
waters are the cause of malarial and malignant fevers, and that the police power is never more
legitimately exercised than in removing such nuisances."); Indeed, many federal programs in the
recent past supported the destruction of wetlands through drainage and filling. I IMPACT OF FED-
ERAL PROGRAMS ON WETLANDS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
12, 25 (1988). The Farm Credit System provided farmers with low interest rates on loans, which
reduced the cost of wetland reclamation. Id. Until 1986, the tax code had provisions that sup-
ported conversion of wetlands to farmland. Id. at 5.
2. See W. NIERING, WETLANDS 30 (1985). This company was chartered in 1764 by the Vir-
ginia Assembly.
3. Id.
4. Swamp Wetland Acts, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519 (1850) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 981-
994 (1988)).
5. The manner in which these areas are defined indicates this change in attitude. Previously,
these areas were referred to dismally as "swamps," "bogs," or "fens." They are now termed "wet-
lands," and these old names have been relegated to the status of characterizations within the new
definition. This can be seen in both the Environmental Protection Agency's and the Army Corps
of Engineers' definitions of wetlands. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1990) (stating that "wet-
lands" means areas frequently saturated by water); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1990) (stating that
wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas).
6. In the State of Florida, for instance, the destruction of acres of wetlands has jeopardized the
very climate of the state. Waldman, Changing the Very Climate of Florida, Wall St. J., July 5,
1990, at I, col. I. A group of climate experts asserts that the draining of South Florida's wetlands
has made the region permanently drier. Id. As H.T. Odum, a University of Florida climatologist,
explained, "When you dry out a landscape, the lower [atmospheric] layers don't have enough
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is reflected in congressional action. Today, the federal government protects the
wanton destruction of the nation's wetlands through the Clean Water Act
("CWA" or "Act").'
The CWA does not, however, protect the nation's wetlands absolutely. 8 The
CWA protects wetlands from activities which discharge any form of material
pollution into a wetland without a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engi-
neers ("Corps"). 9 Moreover, a position recently taken by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"),1" the Corps,1 and at least one federal appellate
court" threatens the protection of wetlands afforded by the CWA. These par-
ties have concluded that the CWA does not apply to individuals who drain
wetlands. Consequently, parties who de-water wetlands and substantially de-
stroy them are able to do so without any federal regulatory intervention.' s
Clearly, if the CWA is to achieve its goal of protecting wetlands,' 4 future
courts and administering agencies must hold that the de-watering of a wetland
is an act regulated by the CWA. This Comment contends that the CWA, as
written, readily supports such a conclusion.
The draining of wetlands is an important and controversial issue because it
affects vast environmental and economic interests. It is undisputed that wet-
lands serve numerous, significant environmental purposes.'5 It is equally clear,
however, that many wetlands exist on land which is highly desirable for devel-
opment. 16 Many projects in the Midwest, for instance, are currently delayed
water vapor to form clouds." Id.
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988).
8. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988) (requiring permits only for discharges of fill and
dredged material).
9. See id. §§ 1311 (a), 1344(a). Section 1311 generally prohibits the discharge of any pollutant
by any person, while § 1344 generally prohibits the discharge of dredged or fill material.
10. See, e.g., Orleans Audubon Soc'y v. Lee, 742 F.2d 901, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1984) (acknowl-
edging the position of the Corps and the EPA that they retained no jurisdiction over the draining
of a wetland); Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 609 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (acknowl-
edging that the "Corps and EPA have made a determination ... that they do not have the legal
jurisdiction or authority to require a permit where the only activity conducted on a legally-desig-
nated wetland is draining or dewatering").
II. See cases cited supra note 10.
12. See Orleans Audubon Soc'y, 742 F.2d at 910-11.
13. At the founding of this nation, there were approximately 215 million acres of wetlands. W.
WANT, THE LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION § 2.01(4) (1990). Now there are an estimated 90
million acres left. Id. Between 300,000 and 458,000 acres are lost every year. Id.
14. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
15. See Topic: Cleaning Up; Warning to Polluters: Break Law, You'll Pay, USA Today, Apr.
3, 1991, at col. 13A. William Reilly, the current administrator of the EPA, stated that wetlands
,are nurseries for most of the fish life in the sea ... [T]hey buffer pollutants and protect prop-
erty from flooding." Id.; see also infra notes 22-49 and accompanying text (discussing the environ-
mental and social value of wetlands).
16. For instance, as much as 40% of California can be classified as wetlands according to the
federal definition of wetlands. See Henderson, Is California 40 Percent Wetlands?, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 3, 1991, at A21, col. 1. The economic value of many wetland areas is increasing due to the
shifting of the nation's populace to the coasts, where most wetlands exist. Id.
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because numerous permits are needed to build on a wetland.17 In particular,
the City of Chicago recently lobbied Congress for legislation to overrule a
Corps determination that protected wetlands were present in an area slated to
become one of the world's largest airports.18 With such competing interests at
stake, it is no wonder that public debate regarding wetland draining has sharp-
ened."9 Fierce battles now rage over such large projects, pitting the interests of
land developers against proponents of conservation."
The Corps' regulatory program balances these competing interests. The per-
mit process of the CWA is essential for adequately addressing the interests of
preservationists and property developers alike. However, the current interpre-
tation of the CWA, which claims that draining activities on wetlands are not
regulated, renders wetlands substantially unprotected. Therefore, the Corps
and the EPA, in particular, need to reexamine the draining issue and interpret
the CWA as regulating de-watering activities.
This Comment begins by describing the importance of wetlands generally.
The Comment then describes the jurisdictional requirements of the CWA.
Next, a recent federal district court case, Save Our Community v. EPA," is
discussed. In this decision, the court disagreed with the Corps' and the EPA's
interpretation of their responsibilities under the CWA with regard to draining.
That discussion is followed by an Analysis which builds upon the Save Our
17. See, e.g., State OK's Old Strip Mine or a Mammoth Landfill, Chicago Trib., Apr. 2, 1991,
§ I, at 1, col. I ("megafill" garbage dump of 995 acres in Illinois depends on a favorable Corps
decision regarding wetlands present at the site); Zabell, Lemont Wetland Tiff up to Army Corps,
Neighbors Oppose Cemetery's Plan, Chicago Trib., Mar. 19, 1991, § 2, at 3, col. 5 (south ed.)
(expansion of a cemetery awaits Corps approval); Swanson, Proposed Balefill Dealt Blow by
Army Corps, Chicago Trib., Feb. 1, 1991, § 2, at I, col. 4 (balefill denied permit despite spending
$11.5 million to buy and develop land).
18. See Locin, City Ties 3rd Airport to Eased Wetland Law, Chicago Trib., Mar. 21, 1991, §
2, at 1, col. 4 (south ed.). The feasibility study for the site foresees filling in 200 acres of wetlands
to build the airport. Id. Responding to this proposal in Congress, the National Wildlife Federation
argued in a written critique that categorizing wetlands protects "only the most highly valued
wetlands and completely abandons any notion of a no-overall-net-loss-of-wetlands goal." Id.
19. The Secretary of Transportation, Samuel K. Skinner, was quoted as saying that building
projects around the country are being held up by "a puddle." Editorial, Chicago Sun-Times, Apr.
3, 1991, at 30, col. 1. Proponents of wetlands counter that "calling the wondrously rich and di-
verse wetlands 'a puddle' [and a nuisance] reflects a destructive ignorance that is distressing and
that threatens us all with a new Dark Ages of a dead planet." Id.
20. Nowhere is the controversy more apparent than between farm groups and conservationists.
Farm groups in the Midwest are upset by what they call "nuisance" wetlands, which may be
small, yet large enough to invoke protection under wetlands laws. See Goering, State Loopholes
Bog Down Wetlands Preservation, Chicago Trib, Apr. 22, 1991, § 2, at 1, col. 1. Representatives
of farm groups say that farmers are frustrated that the presence of wetlands can prevent them
from tilling land they planned on tilling many years ago. Id. at 4. Consequently, powerful farm
groups plan to attack the CWA this year as Congress entertains amendments to the Act. Id.
Conservationists, however, are gaining support for tougher wetlands protections from an in-
creasing number of groups. Homeowners concerned about flooding, and the fishery industries
which rely on wetlands for fish hatching, are just examples of the groups that seek greater protec-
tion for wetlands. Id.
21. 741 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
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Community decision. In particular, the Analysis makes two arguments: (1) the
CWA, as written, requires a permit for de-watering activities, and (2) the
CWA, as written, requires a permit to fill a previously de-watered wetland.
The effect of both of these arguments is to subject the de-watering of a wet-
land to the permit process of the CWA. Finally, this Comment recommends
regulatory amendments that more explicitly address the draining issue, and
discusses the impact of regulating de-watering activities.
I. BACKGROUND
The critical issue addressed by this Comment is whether the dehydration of
a wetland, through the use of a de-watering technique, such as a pump, is a
regulated activity under the CWA. The resolution of this issue requires an
examination of a number of relevant factors: (1) the importance of wetlands,
(2) the CWA's jurisdictional requirements and provisions, and (3) a general
discussion of the draining problem.
A. The Importance of Wetlands
The new "wetland ethic"-to protect the nation's depleting acreage of wet-
lands-acknowledges the numerous economic and social values of wetlands.
More specifically, beneficial qualities of wetlands include environmental val-
ues, water purification attributes, groundwater supply functions, flood control,
and soil erosion prevention. However, before discussing these attributes in de-
tail, a general description of wetlands is necessary. A more technical definition
is provided in this Comment below.
2 2
In traditional parlance, wetlands are associated with areas such as swamps,
bogs, ponds, marshes, and fens .2 Generally, wetland areas encompass "every-
thing that's underwater, everything that's a little soggy, and everything that
used to be a little soggy."'24 Wetlands are transitional areas-not completely
dry land, nor entirely aquatic. 5 As the name implies, the basic element which
22. See infra notes 85-132 and accompanying text.
23. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1990) (defining wetlands to include "swamps, marshes, bogs,
and similar areas"); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1990) (same). One of the most unforgettable depictions
of a wetland is in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's The Hound of the Baskervilles where the author
describes the Great Grimpen Mire: "Rank weeds and lush, slimy water plants send an odour of
decay and a heavy miasmatic vapor in our faces, while a false step plunged us more than once
thigh-deep into the dark, quivering mire, which shook for yards in soft undulations around our
feet." W. NIERING, supra note 2, at 19 (quoting A.C. DOYLE, THE HOUND OF THE
BASKERVILLES).
24. Lavelle, Wetlands: The New Battle Cry in Washington, NAT'L L.J., July 23, 1990, at 24
.(quoting wetlands scholar Oliver A. Houck of Tulane Law School).
25. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985). In Riverside
Bayview Homes, the Supreme Court, while grappling with the notion of "waters of the United
States," gave an apt description of wetlands:
the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt
one. Rather, between open waters and dry land may lie shallows, marshes, mud flats,
swamps, bogs-in short, a huge array of areas that are not wholly aquatic but never-
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sets these areas apart from others is wetness. Wetlands, therefore, are areas
where water is the primary factor controlling the environment.
The presence of water, however, is not the only distinguishing factor be-
tween wetlands and dry land. Many of the plants and animals that typically
inhabit these areas are unique to wetlands. Plants such as cattails, willows,
and red maples are specially adapted to handle various periods of flood and
saturation." In addition, many types of animals depend heavily on wetlands,
such as ducks, alligators, beavers, and a myriad assortment of smaller animals
and insects."' Also setting wetlands apart from other areas is their tremendous
ecological, economic, and social importance, an importance only recently em-
bodied in the new "wetland ethic."
Wetlands are one of the most environmentally and commercially valuable
ecosystems in the world. Wetlands, for instance, provide a habitat of high
value for a wide variety of fish and wildlife. Wetlands also serve as necessary
food sources and spawning grounds for two-thirds of the commercially impor-
tant fish and shellfish harvested along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. 9 The
nation's annual commercial harvest of wetland-dependent fish is valued at over
seven billion dollars.3 0 In addition, almost all significant recreational fish, in-
cluding freshwater varieties, spawn in the aquatic areas of wetlands.31 Wet-
lands also serve as nesting, feeding, and resting areas for many species of wa-
terfowl and migratory birds.3 2 The decimation of the duck population in the
United States has recently been linked to the destruction of wetlands. 3 This
decimation is so great that it prompted the Fish and Wildlife Service to
shorten drastically the 1990 duck hunting season.3 ' In fact, the survival of
one-third of all endangered species in the United States directly depends upon
theless fall far short of being dry land.
Id.
26. W. NIERING, supra note 2, at 21-24.
27. Id.
28. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES, CURRENT STATUS
AND RECENT TRENDS 13-25 (1984) [hereinafter WETLANDS TRENDS]; see also Gill, Wetland
Habitat Values to Upland Wildlife, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE-WETLANDS OF THE
CHESAPEAKE 96 (1986) (referring to wetlands as the most productive wildlife habitat of all
landforms).
29. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OUR NATION'S WETLANDS, AN INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE REPORT 2 (1978).
30. Possible Amendments to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 1982: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Water Resources of the House Committee on Public Works & Transportation,
97th Cong., Ist Sess. 1319, 1337 (1982) (statement of Thomas G. Tomasello, representing the
National Wildlife Federation). The National Wildlife Federation conducted exhaustive studies
concerning the importance of wetlands to the nation's economy. Id.
31. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 29, at 13.
32. Id. at 14.
33. Satchell, Where Have All the Ducks Gone?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 24, 1988, at
72.
34. Id. The health of the nation's waterfowl is thought to be an accurate barometer of the
entire ecological well-being of the continent. Id.
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the continued existence of wetland ecology.88
In addition to their high habitat and economic value, wetlands also provide
many social benefits.88 Wetlands, for instance, act as the "lungs" of the water
system, filtering out pollutants and aerating the water. The capacity of a wet-
land to purify water has been demonstrated by recent studies in Georgia,
where water heavily contaminated with human and other organic wastes was
sent through a wetland. 7 After passing through two and three-quarter miles
of wetland, the contaminated water was found to be clean.8
Wetlands more frequently purify water through a downward flow of surface
water and precipitation.8 9 The polluted water sifts its way through the various
layers of vegetation and soil, emerging relatively pure into underground water
bodies." This purifying capability can be harnessed for an inexpensive method
to treat waste. Thirty-one towns in the United States and Canada have built
artificial wetlands to treat municipal waste and sewage since the 1970s."
A related function of wetlands is the storage and discharge of flood waters
into adjacent streams and lakes.' 2 At times of flooding caused by precipitation
or snow thaws, wetlands very often store water like gigantic "sponges.' ' 3 This
prevents considerable flood damage from occurring in downstream bodies of
water. 1 A gradual release of these waters can be crucial for lakes and streams
35. Hearings on S. 777 Before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Senate
Committee on Environmental & Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., app. on Wetlands Values 4
(1982) (testimony of J. Hair on behalf of 12 environmental groups). Out of the 276 endangered
species in the United States, 80 species directly depend upon wetlands for survival. Id.
36. See generally FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN., A METHOD FOR WETLAND FUNCTIONAL AS-
SESSMENT 7-15 (1983) [hereinafter WETLAND ASSESSMENT] (discussing relevant wetland functions
and values); Caplin, Is Congress Protecting Our Water? The Controversy over Section 404, Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 455-56 (1977)
(summarizing the important functions of wetlands).
37. Klockenbrink, Small Towns Build Artificial Wetlands to Treat Sewage, N.Y. Times, Nov.
29, 1989, at C4, col. I.
38. Id. see also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 29, at 23 (describing the
ecological values of inland wetlands) (citing Goodwin & Niering, Inland Wetlands: Their Ecolog-
ical Role and Environmental Status, 55 BULL. ECOLOGICAL SOC'Y AM. 2 (1974)).
39. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, THE FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED WET-
LANDS OF CHINCOTEAGUE ISLAND, VA. (1986). This is true of the wetlands on Chincoteague Is-
land, Virginia. The wetland contributes a significant amount of freshwater to a layer of freshwater
that underlies the island. Id.; see also WETLAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 36, at 7-11 (finding that
wetlands remove impurities in downward flowing water).
40. Williamson, The Swampbusters, OUTDOOR LIFE, Feb. 1987, at 42. Purification of water
through a wetland is'described in terms of an ecological cycle: "as water flows slowly through the
wetland, sediments, fertilizers, pesticides, sewage and industrial wastes are filtered out, digested,
and cycled through aquatic vegetation and microorganisms. Larger animals such as ducks and fish
then eat these smaller life forms." Id.
41. Klockenbrink, supra note 37, at C4, col. 1. In order to clean up the Des Plaines River, a
$10.2 million project was initiated outside Chicago to create eight wetland basins. Id.
42. WETLAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 36, at 7-12.
43. Odum, Non-Tidal Freshwater Wetlands in Virginia, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 421, 432
(1988).
44. Id.
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during a dry spell, especially when most of the water in these bodies comes
from wetlands.45
Wetlands also help to curb the erosion of shorelines of streams, lakes, and
bays. Wetlands trap erosive forces, such as sediment, in their vegetation."'
This function can be very useful when a wetland exists between an agricul-
tural area and a river . 7 During a storm, soil from the farmland is caught in
the wetland's fibrous complexity of plants."' Therefore, very little soil reaches
the river.49 This filter effect can also prevent the seepage of large amounts of
fertilizer from agricultural areas to water bodies, thus avoiding the danger of
nutrient pollution.50
Congress acknowledged the vital role that wetlands play in this country
when it enacted the CWA. Despite attempted amendments to exclude areas
such as wetlands from regulatory control,51 Congress ultimately left out any
sort of limiting language . 2 More specifically, congressional leaders, such as
Senator Edmund Muskie, recognized the importance of wetlands, stating,
"There is no question that the systematic destruction of the Nation's wetlands
is causing serious, permanent ecological damage . . . . The unregulated de-
struction of these areas is a matter which needs to be corrected and which
implementation of Section 404 [of the CWA] has attempted to achieve."53
Similarly, Senator John Chafee, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on En-
vironmental Pollution, commented, "The section 404 Dredge and Fill Program
[in the CWA] is the most important regulatory tool the Federal Government
has to stem the loss of wetlands." 4
In addition to these and other legislative pronouncements, many commenta-
tors and scientists have asserted that wetland preservation is necessary to meet
the ambitious goal of the CWA: "restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical,
45. WETLAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 36, at 7-12.
46. Id. at 7-19.
47. Odum, supra note 43, at 433.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 434.
51. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976, REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS & TRANSPORTATION. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63
(1976). In this version of § 404, the term "navigable waters" would have been defined more
narrowly, thus limiting the scope of the CWA. Id.
52. For a thorough discussion of several attempts to restrict the Corps' § 404 jurisdiction, see
Caplin, supra note 36, at 459-80.
Courts have recognized that "[in enacting the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (now CWA), Congress intended to extend the Act's jurisdiction to the Constitu-
tional limit." Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Alexander ("Avoyelles 11"), 511 F. Supp. 278, 286
(W.D. La. 1981) (quoting Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 1975) (cita-
tions omitted)), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh,
715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
53. 123 CONG. REC. 26,697 (1977).
54. Oversight Hearings on Section 404 of the Clean Water Act Before the Subcommittee on
Environmental Pollution of the Senate Committee on Environmental & Public Works, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. I (1985).
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physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."55 Since wetlands
make up a significant amount of the "waters of the United States," the goal of
preserving the nation's wetlands is inextricably linked to the larger goal of
restoring and maintaining the nation's water supply. 6
When determining the functional importance of wetlands, it is important to
note that not all wetlands reflect all of the aforementioned attributes. While
one wetland may be noted for its fish spawning qualities, another may be
known for the role it plays in purifying water.5 7
B. Modern-Day Regulation of Wetlands-The Clean Water Act
While scientists have recognized the importance of wetlands since the
1800s, statutory protection of wetlands was slow in coming. Today, however, a
sophisticated statutory scheme exists for protecting wetlands. This statutory
scheme is embodied in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("FWPCA"),5 8 commonly known as the Clean Water Act ("CWA" or
"Act"). 9 Although the CWA was not the first statute that regulated the na-
tion's wetlands,6" it presently represents the principal act by which the federal
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988); see also Tripp & Herz, Wetland Preservation and Restora-
tion: Changing Federal Priorities, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 221, 225 (1988) (citing §
1251(a)).
56. Tripp and Herz argue that Congress, in the amendments of 1977, was not only concerned
with the chemical quality of the nation's waters, but also with the protection of aquatic functions,
in which wetlands are an important component. Tripp & Herz, supra note 55, at 225 n.17; see
also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (describing the mission of the CWA).
57. With regard to the assessment of wetlands for regulatory purposes, neither the Corps nor
the EPA require a wetland to have any particular value. The Corps, however, does conduct a
public interest review that looks at the social, ecological, and biological value of a particular wet-
land. See 33 C.F.R. 320.4(a) (1990).
58. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3669-72. The FWPCA has a history
that predates 1972. The original act passed Congress in 1948. At that time, the FWPCA dele-
gated to the states the responsibility to control water pollution. Id. The federal government's posi-
tion was one of guidance and assistance. Id. In 1956, FWPCA amendments increased funding for
treatment centers and attempted to foster more cooperation between state and federal programs.
Id. In 1965, Congress further amended the FWPCA to require states to meet federal water qual-
ity standards for all interstate navigable waters within the boundaries of each state. Id. In 1972,
Congress substantially amended the act in the wake of failure to curb water pollution. Id.
59. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988).
60. In the 1960s, the Corps, using the authority of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
("RHA"), first issued regulations regarding the protection of wetlands. See Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-416 (1988)). The
RHA was legislated to maintain the navigability of the nation's water courses. 33 U.S.C. § 401
(1988).
Reinterpretation of the RHA to include wetlands under its protection is authorized by the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act. 16 U.S.C. § 662 (1988). This act directs agencies involved in the
alteration of a water body to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service before issuing permits. Id.
The Fish and Wildlife Service consultation concerns the ecological effects of proposed activities on
wildlife and the environment. ld. Such consultation led the Corps to begin what is called its "pub-
lic interest review," whereby the Corps assesses whether the proposed project benefits the public's
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government protects wetlands from destruction."
The CWA has a number of important policy goals. The primary objective of
the Act is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integ-
rity of the Nation's waters."6 2 The Act, as amended in 1977, set a goal of
eliminating all discharges of pollutants into the waters of the United States by
the year 1985.63 In addition, the Act sought to achieve a level of water quality
which "provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wild-
life and provides for recreation in and on the water." '64
Congress' articulated goals for the CWA are limited by the scope of the
Act. Specifically, the jurisdictional requirements of the CWA limit its scope.
Two of the jurisdictional requirements are of particular import for purposes of
the draining issue: first, the area in question must be a "navigable water" of
the United States;65 second, the activity in question must constitute a "dis-
charge of a pollutant" within the meaning of the Act.66 The protective policies
interest in a sound environment. 33 Fed. Reg. 18,672-73, superseded by 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)
(1988). Among the factors included in this public interest review are:
conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, his-
toric properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land use,
navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation,
water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs, consid-
erations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of the people.
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1990).
This public interest review, however, accorded wetlands very little protection because the RHA
only grants the Corps jurisdiction over navigable waters, and most wetlands are not considered
navigable waters. The general definition of "navigable waters" under the RHA reflects the judicial
refinement of the term: "Navigable waters of the United States are those waters that are subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may
be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce." Id. For a discussion of how the
courts have developed a definition of navigable waters, see W. WANT, supra note 13, § 4.07.
The RHA definition of navigable waters must be distinguished from the expansive definition of
"waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977. "Waters of the
United States" includes any "water," and is not limited to those waters that are navigable. Com-
pare 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988) (providing that navigable waters are waters of the United
States) with 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1990) (defining "navigable waters"). Today, however, the Corps'
jurisdiction over navigable waters under the RHA extends beyond the actual definition of naviga-
ble waters. See 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(a) (1990). Any activity that affects a navigable water is consid-
ered to be under the authority of the RHA. Id. The Corps is allowed broad discretion in this type
of determination. Vieux Carre Property Owners v. Brown, 875 F.2d 453, 463 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 720 (1990). Despite this expansion of the RHA definition of navigable
waters, the primary statutory protection for wetlands is the CWA.
61. Oversight Hearings on Section 404 of the Clean Water Act Before the Subcommittee on
Environmental Pollution of the Senate Committee on Environmental & Public Works, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1986) (documenting Senator Chafee's remarks that § 404 is the most impor-
tant tool in protecting wetlands).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
63. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
64. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
65. Id. § 1344(a) (giving the EPA Administrator the authority to issue permits relating to
navigable waters).
66. Id. § 1311(a).
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of the CWA are ineffectual if either of these two jurisdictional elements is
missing. Because of their importance, each jurisdictional requirement is dis-
cussed below in detail.
1. Navigable Waters of the United States
The CWA applies to a great number of bodies of water in the United
States. The CWA has jurisdiction over all "navigable waters,"6 which the Act
defines as "waters of the United States.""8 In 1975, the Corps issued regula-
tions that redefined "waters of the United States." 6 The new definition in-
cluded not only actually navigable waters, but also any waters whose use or
misuse could affect interstate commerce.7
0
Under the present regulations, the Corps breaks down "waters of the United
States" into seven categories, one of which is wetlands.71 This expansive read-
ing of "waters of the United States" was upheld in the landmark case of
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes." In Riverside Bayview Homes,
the Corps filed suit to enjoin a land developer from placing fill materials on his
property.78 The Corps claimed that under its regulations, the land in question
was a wetland, although the wetland was merely adjacent to a body of water,
and the wetland's water did not come from a "navigable water. 77
Examining whether the Corps' regulation was reasonable in light of the lan-
guage, policies, and legislative history of the CWA, the Court held that "wa-
ters of the United States" jurisdiction included wetlands.75 Since the language
in the CWA that addresses the question of whether wetlands are included in
"waters of the United States" is unclear, the Court freely construed the Act's
policies and its legislative history.76 In considering the policies and legislative
history of the CWA, a unanimous Supreme Court held that "the evident
breadth of congressional concern for protection of water quality and ecosys-
tems suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps to interpret the term 'waters'
to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined. 77
The Court also concluded that due to the overwhelming congressional concern
67. Id. § 1344(a).
68. Id. § 1362(7). The term jurisdiction, for the purposes of this Comment, generally refers to
the question of whether the EPA or the Corps has the power to apply the provisions of the Clean
Water Act to a particular project or development. See W. WANT, supra note 13, § 4.01.
69. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (1975).
70. Id.
71. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (1990).
72. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
73. Id. at 124.
74. Id. at 133-34.
75. Id. at 134. "An agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to
deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 131
(citing Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125
(1985)).
76. Id. at 132.
77. Id. at 133.
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for wetlands, a wetland need not be adjacent to a navigable water to be cov-
ered under the CWA, but may be adjacent to any water of the United
States. 8 Finally, the Court noted that the source of water for a wetland does
not have to be limited to flooding or adjacent bodies of open water.79 Thus, it
is clear that the Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview Homes greatly ex-
panded the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA, effectively granting the Corps
a broad jurisdiction over all wetlands in the United States.8 0
The question of "what constitutes a wetland," however, remains open. This
question must be resolved by the Corps. An integral part of the Corps' admin-
istration of the CWA is its duty to determine whether a particular parcel of
land is a wetland. 1 A property owner who wishes to determine if his land is a
wetland,82 and therefore subject to the permit process under section 404(b)(1)
of the CWA, is required to seek a Corps determination.8" This, however, need
not be the owner's first step; many landowners first consult private experts.84
The Corps uses two general tests to determine whether an area constitutes a
wetland. The first test involves an examination of an area to determine if it
embodies three critical wetland characteristics. A second tool is the regulatory
definition of a wetland.
a. Three Criteria for Identifying a Wetland
Four federal agencies, including the EPA, have adopted a Joint Federal
Manual to clarify the technical criteria for identifying and delineating wet-
lands.8" The Manual and the regulatory definition of a wetland, which is dis-
cussed later, are in agreement. Each focuses on three main criteria: (1) wet-
78. Id. at 134.
79. Id.
80. Ernst & Herring, Water, Water Everywhere, Better Call the Corps: Section 404 Regula-
tion of Wetlands, 41 MERCER L. REV. 843, 845 (1990).
81. While not expressly enumerated in the Act, this is a necessary function of the Corps' au-
thority. W. WANT, supra note 13, § 4.02. However, the authority to create technical guidelines for
wetlands determinations is expressly shared between the Administrator of the EPA and the Secre-
tary of the Army. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1988).
82. It should be noted that private property is subject to the jurisdiction of the Corps. There-
fore, one may not conduct regulated activity on even privately owned property without a permit.
See W. WANT, supra note 13, §§ 10.01-.08 (discussing the takings defense under the fifth amend-
ment and the problems involved with wetlands regulation).
83. Cf. 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.1(a)(6), 325.9 (1990) (authorizing the Corps to issue formal determi-
nations about CWA applicability).
84. This is done for many reasons. The Corps generally will expedite a determination if a pri-
vate assessment has already been done. See W. WANT, supra note 13, § 4.02(4). In addition, a
property owner may want to have a private assessment in order to defend against an adverse
determination by the Corps. Id.
85. FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS
(1989) [hereinafter FEDERAL MANUAL]. The other federal agencies involved include the Depart-
ment of the Army, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Soil Conservation Service. Id. at 1. This
federal manual was promulgated to replace several manuals issued by the Corps and the EPA. Id.
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land hydrology, (2) hydrophytic vegetation, and (3) hydric soils.86 The
wetland hydrology element, simply stated, is a water requirement. Indeed, the
word "wetland" is a particularly simple and aptly descriptive term.87 As the
name suggests, a wetland's critical characteristic is the presence of water on a
periodic or permanent basis.88 Hence, when the Manual speaks of wetlands
hydrology, it is referring to the amount of water necessary for an area to be
called a wetland."
The source of the water is not of critical importance for determining
whether an area is a wetland. Some courts have concluded that groundwater is
a sufficient water source.9" A district court decision, Bailey v. United States,"'
went even further by holding that it was not necessary for groundwater to
reach the area's surface if characteristics of wetland soil saturation were pre-
sent.92 Furthermore, in United States v. Fleming Plantation," another federal
district court held that rainwater could be a water source for a wetland.94 In
fact, courts have even extended the jurisdiction of the CWA to man-made,
artificial wetlands, implying that water can come from any source
whatsoever. 98
In addition, it is clear that hydrologic factors need only exist periodically, as
opposed to continually, throughout the wetland's existence.98 The definition of
a wetland refers to inundation "at a frequency and duration" sufficient to sup-
port a prevalence of wetlands vegetation. 97 In applying this definition, courts
have held that wetlands need only be subject to periodic inundation, rather
86. Id. at 2.
87. As the term "wetland" implies, "wetlands are areas that are conceptually, hydrologically,
and geographically somewhere between dry land and normally permanent bodies of water."
Odum, supra note 43, at 422-23.
88. The presence of water is an undisputed criterion of a wetlands determination. All defini-
tions of wetlands suggest the need for some sort of saturation. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1990)
(including areas "inundated or saturated by ... water"); 40 C.F.R. § 230(t) (1990) (same); W.
WANT, supra note 13, § 4.03. The same holds for the congressional definition of wetlands devel-
oped pursuant to the 1985 "Swampbuster" legislation. See 16 U.S.C. § 3502 (1988) (including
wetlands affected by wave, tidal, and wind energies).
89. FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 85, at 3.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985) (noting
that a wetland need not be the result of flooding or have its source from adjacent waters).
91. 647 F. Supp. 44 (D. Idaho 1986).
92. Id. at 47-48; accord United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189, 192 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding
that saturation can be demonstrated by the presence of wetlands plants), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1016 (1989).
93. 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1705 (E.D. La. 1978).
94. Id. at 1708. The court found that as to "the question of periodic inundation, .... the Corps
of Engineers, as early as October of 1975 recogniz[ed] rainfall as a source of inundation for
wetlands." Id. at 1707.
95. See United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 494 (D.N.J. 1984); see also Weizman v.
District Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302, 1305 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that artificially created canals con-
nected to existing waterways are wetlands).
96. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1990).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
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than constant inundation. In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Alexander
("Avoyelles II")" for instance, the court held that the water requirement for
a wetland is determined by the "land's capacity under normal circumstances
to support a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions." 99
Like the Avoyelles II court, the court in Bayou St. John Improvement As-
sociation v. Sands'00 required periodic inundation, as opposed to constant sat-
uration, for a positive wetland determination. 10' In Bayou St. John, the court
held that submerged grasslands do not qualify as wetlands. 02 Submerged
grasslands, by definition, are subject to constant and complete saturation dur-
ing the year.'0 3 Since periodic inundation is required for wetlands, the court
concluded that constantly submerged grasslands were not wetlands within the
jurisdiction of the CWA. 10 4
Not every periodic saturation of an area satisfies the Federal Manual's hy-
drology element. Determining when an area has become sufficiently inundated
so as to satisfy this criterion is indeed difficult.' 05 According to the Federal
Manual, "The presence of water for a week or more during the growing season
typically creates anaerobic conditions in the soil . . " 106 The Manual, how-
ever, is quick to warn that one week of inundation may not be enough to
satisfy the hydrology element.0 7
Because the calculus involved in determining the existence of the hydrology
element is difficult, the Federal Manual asserts that emphasis in the wetlands
determination process should be placed upon the vegetation and soil require-
ments.' However, because the water requirement is intricately linked to the
Manual's soil and vegetation requirements, it clearly cannot be ignored.'0 9
Water causes oxygen to be driven from the wetland's soil, and therefore, cre-
ates "hydric" soil." 0 In turn, because the wetland's soil is devoid of oxygen,
98. 511 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. La. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom, Avoyelles
Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
99. Id. at 289.
100. 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,011 (E.D. La. 1982).
101. Id. at 20,013.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 85, at 12 (acknowledging that the wetland hydrology ele-
ment is the most difficult criterion to establish because it is a very inexact requirement).
106. Id. The growing season is pertinent because wetland plants are usually dormant except for
this period, and the water, therefore, has no impact. W. WANT, supra note 13, § 4.09.
107. FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 85, at 12-13. However the Corps has stated that the rule of
thumb for landowners is whether, after digging a hole 12 inches in depth, water stands. If so, then
a wetlands determination should be made. CORPS OF ENGINEERS, RECOGNIZING WETLANDS 12
(1987).
108. FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 85, at 26.
109. Id.
110. "Hydric soils" are flooded or saturated long enough to develop anaerobic conditions. The
water in the soil displaces oxygen that would normally exist between soil particles in drier soil.
SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, HYDRIC SOILS OF THE UNITED STATES 32 (1985).
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only plants adapted to such anaerobic conditions can survive in a wetland.1
In this way, the water requirement plays an intricate role in establishing both
the soil and the vegetation criteria.1 2
The second criteria used to determine if an area constitutes a wetland is the
Manual's hydrophytic vegetation requirement. The type of vegetation required
for an area to constitute a wetland includes those plants "typically adapted for
life in saturated soils." ' 18 The Federal Manual refers to this type of vegetation
as "hydrophytic."' 1' Examples of hydrophytes are marsh grasses, willows, tu-
pelos, gums, and cypress trees.' The Federal Manual specifies five categories
of plant types and their respective rate of occurrence in a wetland environ-
ment." To determine if a particular plant is in one of these categories, one
should refer to the National List of Plant Species That Occur in Wetlands.'
Wetlands plants do not have to live their entire life cycle in saturated soil.
Rather, a significant portion of the growing season may be spent in hydric
soil. "'18 Also, the presence of transitional plant species does not remove an area
from a wetlands classification." 9 Therefore, plant types other than strictly hy-
drophytic vegetation may be present in a wetland area. Such inclusion of a
wide variety of vegetation broadens the regulatory definition of a wetland, al-
lowing a greater number of areas in the United States to fall under supervision
of the Corps.
The final of the three criteria examined by the Corps to determine if an
area constitutes a wetland is the hydric soil requirement. Hydric soils are de-
fined as "soils that are saturated, flooded, or ponded long enough during the
growing season to develop anaerobic conditions . . . . In general, hydric soils
are flooded, ponded, or saturated for usually one week or more." 120
The Federal Manual states that all three criteria, wetland hydrology, hydro-
phytic vegetation, and hydric soil, must be present for a wetland determina-
tion.' 8 ' The Manual, however, allows the presumption of one criterion from
Ill. W. WANT, supra note 13, § 4.03(l)(a).
112. FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 85, at 12; W. WANT, supra note 13, § 4.03(l)(a).
113. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1990).
114. FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 85, at 5.
115. CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 107, at 4. Typical crops grown in wetland soils include,
among others, rice and cranberries. See United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir.)
(characterizing wild rice as a wetland crop), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986).
116. FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 85, at 9. These five categories were mentioned in United
States v. Malibu Beach, Inc., where the existence of a wetland was proved by the type of vegeta-
tion growing in the area. See United States v. Malibu Beach, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.J.
1989).
117. This publication was developed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
118. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh ("Avoyelles II1"), 715 F.2d 897, 910-13 (5th Cir.
1983) (discussing vegetation adapted to exist in saturated soil conditions).
119. See United States v. Carter, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1804, 1808-09 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(finding the land in question to be wetlands based on the presence of sawgrass and periphyton on
the land).
120. FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 85, at 10.
121. See W. WANT, supra note 13, § 4.09.
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the existence of another. 12 2 Therefore, a finding of hydric soils can be pre-
sumed from a finding of either the water or vegetation requirement, for all
three criteria are dependent upon each other.12 The soil requirement, while
important in some cases, is usually not the pivotal issue in wetland
determinations.1 24
b. Regulatory Definition of a Wetland
In addition to the three criteria articulated in the Federal Manual, the
Corps also examines the regulatory definition of a wetland in determining
whether an area is a wetland. The Corps defines wetlands as:
[T]hose areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at
a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal cir-
cumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life
in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes,
bogs, and similar areas.2 0
This definition clearly encompasses, albeit in a more general manner, the
Manual's three criteria discussed above. The significant addition that the defi-
nition provides to the wetland determination process is its "under normal cir-
cumstances" language. This qualifying language requires the presence of wet-
land hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, and hydric soil "under normal
circumstances."1 16 According to a Regulatory Guidance Letter ("RGL") is-
sued by the Corps in 1986, the phrase "under normal circumstances" is in-
tended to respond to those situations where "an individual would attempt to
eliminate the permit review requirements of Section 404 [of the CWA] by
destroying the aquatic vegetation, and to those areas that are not aquatic but
experience an abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation."' 27 The purpose of this
phrase, therefore, is to allow the Corps to retain jurisdiction over a wetland
which has been abnormally stripped of a wetland attribute." 8
In a more recent RGL, the Corps stated that the "under normal circum-
stances" language includes an evaluation of the hydrology and hydrophytic
vegetation of the area.' 29 In addition, the Corps will look to the purpose of any
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Malibu Beach, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1301, 1312 (D.N.J. 1989)
(discussing whether the "wetlands" at issue were adjacent to navigable waters).
125. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1990); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1990).
126. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1990) (emphasis added); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1990).
127. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 86-9 (Aug. 27, 1986)
[hereinafter Corps RGL No. 86-91.
128. Id. The RGL goes on to state that "[sleveral instances of destruction of aquatic vegetation
to eliminate Section 404 jurisdiction have actually occurred. Because those areas would still sup-
port aquatic vegetation 'under normal circumstances,' they remain part of the overall aquatic
system intended to be protected by the Section 404 program; therefore, 404 jurisdiction still ex-
ists." Id.
129. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 90-7 (Sept. 26, 1990)
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"disturbance to hydrophytic vegetation."' 30 If that purpose was to avoid regu-
lation, then the Corps will continue to assert jurisdiction over the area.'
The fact that the Corps determines an area to be a wetland, however, does
not by itself trigger the jurisdiction of the CWA. Rather, with respect to de-
watering activities in particular, a second jurisdictional element is needed.
This critical element turns on whether a landowner's proposed activity on the
wetland falls within section 301 of the CWA, and more specifically, section
404.132
2. Discharge of a Pollutant
Section 301 generally prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into a wet-
land. 8' "Discharge of a pollutant" means "any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source."'"' Under the Act, "pollutant" in-
cludes a wide array of materials which can be discharged into the water.1 35
The term "pollution" is given a broad definition, encompassing any "man-
made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and ra-
diological integrity of water."' 36 The general prohibition against discharges in
section 301, however, is not absolute. Rather, section 404 provides an excep-
tion to the general prohibition. 3 7
Section 404 provides that the "discharge of dredged or fill material" into
the waters of the United States, which includes wetlands, is not prohibited if a
party first obtains a permit for such activity.' 38 Accordingly, section 404 re-
quires a permit for many activities conducted on a wetland, including: (1)
placement of fill material, (2) ditching activities when the excavated material
is cast aside, (3) levee and dike construction, (4) land-clearing which involves
movement of soil, (5) leveling of land, (6) road construction, and (7) dam
[hereinafter Corps RGL No. 90-7].
130. Id.
131. Id. The Corps RGL states, "In such a case, where the Corps.can determine or reasonably
infer that the purpose of the physical disturbance to hydrophytic vegetation was to avoid regula-
tion, the Corps will continue to assert section 404 jurisdiction." Id.
132. See Orleans Audubon Soc'y v. Lee, 742 'F.2d 901, 912 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that
draining activities did not require a Corps' permit pursuant to § 404); Avoyelles Sportsmen's
League v. Alexander ("Avoyelles I1"), 511 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. La. 1981) (holding that land fell
under purview of Corps' permitting authority), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Avoyelles
Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988).
134. Id. § 1362(12)(A).
135. Id. § 1362(6). The definition states: "The term pollutant means dredged spoil, solid waste,
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological mater-
ials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock sand, cellar dirt, and in-
dustrial municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." Id.
136. Id. § 1362(19).
137. Id. § 1344(a) (providing an exception for the discharge of "dredged or fill material" if a
permit has been issued).
138. Id.
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construction. 3 9
The Administrator of the EPA is charged with the enforcement of section
301 of the CWA 4 0 and is allowed to grant permits for certain pollutant dis-
charges.'41 Within this general EPA authority, the Corps has a special author-
ity, pursuant to section 404,"1 to issue permits for two particular types of
discharges: dredged"" and fill material."' The Corps' authority, while exclu-
sive under section 404 of the CWA, is subject to a veto power retained by the
EPA.'" As a matter of practice, however, the Corps administers the day-to-
day operations of the programs contained in the CWA.' 6
Before the Corps can grant a section 404 permit, it must conduct a "public
interest review.""' The review is an overall balancing of the benefits to be
derived from the proposed project against the foreseeable costs.14 8 The Corps
has special regulations for investigating the costs associated with a proposed
139. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)-(f) (1990).
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1988).
141. Id. § 1342.
142. Id. § 1344(a) (noting that the "Secretary" of the Army has the authority to issue per-
mits). This authority was delegated to the Corps for two reasons. The Corps previously adminis-
tered the regulatory program for wetlands under the RHA. Therefore, Congress wanted to in-
crease efficiency and not duplicate authority over the waters of the United States. See W. WANT,
supra note 13, § 2.02(2). Second, the Corps itself and its legislative supporters did not want the
authority of the Corps to be controlled by another agency. Id.
Under the CWA, a landowner who plans to conduct operations on a wetland applies for an
individual permit. Id. § 6.01. The Corps conducts a "case by case evaluation ...involving the
proposed discharges" and determines whether the "proposed discharge is in the public interest."
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(g) (1990); see also Ernst & Herring, supra note 80, at 851-62 (discussing in
detail the procedures for applying to the Corps for a § 404 permit).
143. Under the Corps' regulations, the term "dredged material" means "material that is exca-
vated or dredged from the waters of the United States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1990).
144. "Fill material" means "any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic
area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody. The term does not include
any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated
under section 402 of the Clean Water Act." Id. § 323.2(e).
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1988). The section provides:
The Administrator [of the EPA] is authorized to prohibit the specification ...of any
defined areas as a disposal site ...whenever he [she] determines, after notice and
opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of such materials into such area
will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds,
and fishery areas, .... wildlife, or recreational areas.
id.
146. The .Corps does the field work and the jurisdictional determination. Memorandum of
Agreement between the Department of the Army and the Environmental Protection Agency Con-
cerning Federal Enforcement for the Section 404 Program of the Clean Water Act (Jan. 19,
1989) [hereinafter Memorandum]. Therefore, the EPA is relegated to a reviewing authority. Id.
There are certain instances, however, where the EPA will act as lead agency under § 404. These
include those instances where any of these criteria are present: repeat violators, flagrant violations,
where EPA requests a class of cases or a particular case, or the Corps recommends that an EPA
administrative penalty action may be warranted. Id.
147. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1990).
148. Id. (noting that the benefits of granting a permit must be weighed against detriments).
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project on a particular wetland.' These special regulations mention eight rea-
sons why wetlands are "considered to perform functions important to the pub-
lic interest"'"0 and proclaim that the unnecessary destruction of wetlands
"should be discouraged as contrary to the public interest."' 5' 1 Nevertheless, if a
project's benefits to the public outweigh the "importance" of the wetland, the
permit will be issued."' Several courts and commentators have criticized the
public interest review as essentially standardless, affording little instruction to
district engineers.?"
Section 404 does not, however, require a public interest review or a permit
for every act that causes a discharge or fill material to be deposited on a wet-
land. Certain activities are expressly exempted from regulation under section
404.1' Among other exceptions, section 404(f)(1) exempts: (1) various normal
149. Id. § 320.4(b).
150. Id. § 320.4(b)(2). The regulations list the wetlands that are considered to perform func-
tions important to the public interest, including:
(i) Wetlands which serve significant natural biological functions, including food
chain production, general habitat and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for
aquatic or land species;
(ii) Wetlands set aside for study of the aquatic environment or as sanctuaries or
refuges;
(iii) Wetlands the destruction or alteration of which would affect detrimentally nat-
ural drainage characteristics, sedimentation patterns, salinity distribution, flushing
characteristics, current patterns, or other environmental characteristics;
(iv) Wetlands which are significant in shielding other areas from wave action, ero-
sion, or storm damage. Such wetlands are often associated with barrier beaches, is-
lands, reefs and bars;
(v) Wetlands which serve as valuable storage areas for storm and flood waters;
(vi) Wetlands which are ground water discharge areas that maintain minimum
baseflows important to aquatic resources and those which are prime natural recharge
areas;
(vii) Wetlands which serve significant water purification functions; and
(viii) Wetlands which are unique in nature or scarce in quantity to the region or
local area.
Id. The regulations echo most of the values discussed supra at notes 22-49 and accompanying
text.
151. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(1) (1990).
152. Id. § 320.4(b)(4). The Corps is also required to prepare an Environmental Impact State-
ment ("EIS") if they determine that the proposed activity will have a notable adverse impact on
the human environment. See W. WANT, supra note 13, §§ 6.30-6.31. This is pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982).
153. See, e.g., Mall Properties v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561, 569 (D. Mass. 1987) (remanding a
permit request to the Corps for reevaluation after it was previously denied based upon economic
factors unrelated to the environment); Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory
Program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 63 VA. L. REV. 503, 547-56 (1977) (reviewing
and criticizing the permit decisionmaking process of the Corps).
154. See 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(1) (1988). These exemptions include:
(A) . . . normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities such as plowing, seed-
ing, cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting . . .
(B) . . . maintenance including emergency reconstruction of . . . dikes, dams, levees,
groins, riprap, breakwaters, causeways, and bridge abutments or approaches, and
transportation structures;
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farming activities, (2) maintenance and emergency repair of currently service-
able structures, and (3) general maintenance of drainage ditches, but not their
construction. 1 5
Despite these seemingly broad exemptions, courts have interpreted the lan-
guage of section 404(f)(1) narrowly.5' The Corps has similarly limited the
expanse of section 404 exemptions through its regulations. The "normal farm-
ing" exemption, for example, applies only to those activities that are "part of
an established farming" operation. 57 Additionally, in United States v. Lar-
kins,'58 the Sixth Circuit held that the normal farming exemption does not
apply to the removal of trees from a wetland in order to convert it to dry
farmland because such activity was not "normal" within the meaning of the
exemption. 159
In addition to reading the exemptions in section 404(0(1) strictly, another,
more substantive, limitation exists on the use of these exemptions. Section
404(f)(2) of the Act, commonly referred to as the "recapture provision" or
"recapture principle," explicitly limits the application of section 404(f)(1) ex-
emptions. 60 The recapture provision makes a section 404(0(1) exemption in-
applicable if the activity in question has "as its purpose bringing an area of
the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject."''
More generally, the recapture provision in section 404(f)(2) provides that
"any discharge . . . incidental" to a change in use of the waters of the United
States requires a permit. 62 The Corps' regulations reflect the importance of
such a limiting provision, especially for wetlands. The Corps has stated that
"any [exempt activity] must have a permit if it is part of an activity whose
purpose is to convert an area of the waters of the United States" and "[a]
conversion of a section 404 wetland to a non-wetland is a change in use of an
(C) . . . construction or maintenance of farm or stock ponds or irrigation ditches, or
the maintenance of drainage ditches;
(D) . . . construction of temporary sedimentation basins on a construction site which
does not include placement of fill material into the navigable waters;
(E) . . . construction or maintenance of farm roads or forest roads, or temporary
[mining roads] ....
Id.; see also 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a) (1990).
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1988).
156. See United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir.) (construing the provisions nar-
rowly based on congressional intent), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986); United States v. Hueb-
ner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1241 (7th Cir.) (interpreting the agricultural exemption narrowly), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985).
157. 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii)(1990).
158. 852 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1016 (1989).
159. Id. at 192-93; see also Note, United States v. Larkins: Conflict Between Wetland Protec-
tion and Agriculture: Exploration of the Farming Exemption to the Clean Water Act's Section
404 Permit Requirement, 35 S.D.L. REV. 272 (1990) (discussing Larkins and the issue of the
farming exemption in general).
160. Ernst & Herring, supra note 80, at 848; Tripp & Herz, supra note 55, at 237.
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (1988).
162. Id.
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area of the waters of the United States." ' 3
In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh ("Avoyelles III")164 the Fifth
Circuit used the recapture provision to require a landowner to obtain a permit
for land-clearing activities conducted on a wetland.165 The landowner had cut
timber and vegetation from a wetland in order to turn the area into farmland
for soybean cultivation. " The landowners claimed that their activity fell
within the normal farming exemption listed in section 404(f)(1). 167 The court
rejected this contention and held that the recapture provision in section
404(0(2) precluded the application of the exemption because the land owners,
through their activities, intended to convert the wetland into dry farmland.
6 1
The court reasoned, "Read together, the two parts of section 404(f) provide a
narrow exemption for agricultural and silvicultural activities that have little or
no adverse effect on the nation's waters."169 Therefore, the recapture provision
rendered meritless any contention that the landowners' activities were ex-
empted under section 404(0(1).
In addition to the listed exemptions in section 404(f)(1), another exemption,
not specifically articulated in section 404, exists. This exemption is commonly
referred to as the "de minimis exception." This exception exempts from the
permit requirement of section 404 those activities which involve only a de
minimis discharge.""0 A de minimis discharge is a discharge of small propor-
tions which, by itself, will have little environmental impact.' 7' Advocates jus-
tify the use of a de minimis discharge under the regulatory program of the
Act because such discharges do not fill or otherwise destroy a wetland. 171 Such
is the case where earthen material is deposited into a wetland through acci-
dental seepage from a truck or other vehicle.' 7 .
The legitimacy of a de minimis discharge exception is debated. The EPA
and the Corps, in addition to a number of courts, support the notion of a de
minimis exception. 7 14 Several courts, on the other hand, have recognized com-
163. 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(c) (1990).
164. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
165. Id. at 925-26.
166. Id. at 901.
167. Id. at 925.
168. Id. at 925-26.
169. Id. at 926.
170. The Corps purports to derive the authority to exempt de minimis discharges from §
404(f)(1) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1) (1988), and from its authority to issue general
permits for minimal impact categories of activities covered under § 404(e) of the CWA, 33
U.S.C. § 1344(e) (1988).
171. Interview, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in Chicago (Feb. 7, 1991) [hereinafter inter-
view]. One example of such minimal discharge is the material falling out of a vehicle that is
transporting excavation refuse. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(d) (1990) (The discharge of dredged material "does not include de
minimis incidental soil movement occurring during normal dredging operations."); see also Office
of the Chief of Engineers Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 81-4 (1982) (creating a de minimis
[Vol. 40:10591078
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pelling reasons against a de minimis exception to section 404.1 Additionally,
some commentators have articulated a more intermediate position. These com-
mentators have asserted that certain activities, such as agricultural draining or
channelization, are improperly exempted because, despite their de minimis
discharge, these activities have an overall highly destructive impact. 176
Interestingly, the Corps' treatment of the de minimis exception differs from
its application of section 404(f)(1) exemptions. The Corps has not applied the
recapture provision of section 404(f)(2) to the de minimis exception."' De-
spite judicial authorization for a broad interpretation of the recapture provi-
sion, 78 the Corps continues to apply the recapture provision narrowly, viewing
the language in the provision as directed solely to activities exempt under sec-
tion 404(f)(1). 17 1
Commentators have recognized that the Corps' application of the recapture
provision is unduly restrictive. 80 They have argued that the Corps' authority
to exempt destructive de minimis discharges should also be limited by section
exception for discharges, such as drippings from a bucket, which occur during normal dredging
operations).
175. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh ("Avoyelles ill"), 715 F.2d 897, 919 n.37
(5th Cir. 1983) (stating that it is the authority of the Corps to determine what constitutes a de
minimis discharge); Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 625-27 (8th
Cir. 1979) (rejecting the district court's conclusion that a significant discharge is required before a
discharge is a pollutant); Reid v. Marsh, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ohio
1984) (holding that de minimis discharges are not exempted from § 404 permit requirements).
176. See, e.g., Tripp & Hertz, supra note 55, at 238.
177. Interview, supra note 171.
178. United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817
(1985). The Huebner court stated that "Congress intended that Section [404] (f)(l) exempt from
the permit process only 'narrowly defined activities . . . that cause little or no adverse effects
either individually or cumulatively [and which do not] convert more extensive areas of water into
dry land or impede circulation or reduce the reach and size of the water body.'" Id. (quoting 123
CONG. REC. 38,997 (1977), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF
1977, at 420 (1978) (statement of Rep. Harsha during discussion of § 404(f)(1))); see also
United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1176 (D. Mass. 1986) (stating that
"Section (404](0(2), the 'recapture provision,' seizes upon certain activities that on their face
appear exempt in order to bring them under the statute"), affd, 826 F.2d 1151 (lst Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988); Bayou Marcus Livestock & Agricultural Co. v. EPA, 20
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,445 (N.D. Fla. 1989). In Bayou, a plaintiff claimed that his
land-clearing activities were under the exemption for silviculture because tree harvesting had been
done for a period of four years. Id. The court found that this land-clearing was not a part of an
ongoing activity, and that the activity seriously affected the ecology of the wetlands. Id. Therefore,
§ 404(0(2) prohibited him from continuing without a permit. Id.
Despite the courts' willingness to interpret § 404(0(2) broadly, the Corps refuses to expand its
application of the provision to include all activities that may convert a wetland. The Corps applies
the "recapture provision" exclusively to the exemptions contained in § 404(f)(1).
179. See, e.g., Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 610 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (where
the EPA and the Corps determined that they did not have jurisdiction over the minor discharges
associated with the installation of a pump).
180. Tripp & Herz, supra note 55, at 238-39. Such a broad interpretation of § 404(0(2) is
seen as a case where the exception has swallowed the rule, at least when applied to activities
occurring on virgin wetlands. Id. at 237.
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404(f)(2)."'8 Since the Corps extends the authority contained in section
404(f)(1) to exempt all de minimis discharges, then it should also extend the
recapture provision to all activities which involve a change in use of a
wetland.1 82
In sum, two critical elements must exist before the jurisdiction of the CWA
is triggered. First, the area in question must be a wetland within the regula-
tory meaning. Second, the activity in question must constitute a discharge of a
pollutant. Moreover, the discharge in question cannot be one of the exempted
activities listed in section 404(f)(1), unless the recapture provision of section
404(f)(2) applies. Absent a finding of these two jurisdictional elements, the
draining of a wetland is beyond the reach of federal regulation under the
CWA.
C. The Draining Problem-Destroying Wetlands While Circumventing the
Permit Process Under Section 404
Draining a wetland without obtaining a section 404 permit has become a
popular way of destroying wetlands. 88 The draining is accomplished through
the installation and use of a mechanical pump or other de-watering device.'84
The water is drained out of the wetland, thereby destroying the water, soil,
and vegetation conditions necessary for jurisdictional wetlands to be found.'85
After this process is completed, the landowner is free to fill the land and de-
velop it without the jurisdiction of the CWA attaching.'88
A restrictive reading of the CWA appears to support the conclusion that the
physical removal of water from a wetland is not regulated under the CWA. It
appears that the statute is invoked only if a party "discharges a pollutant"
into the waters of the United States. 87 In addition, the section 404 permit
process is only invoked when an activity discharges fill or dredged material
into the waters of the United States. 88
181. Id.
182. Id. The plain language of § 404(f)(2) seems to support this argument. "Any discharge"
incidental to a change in use "shall be required to have a permit under [§ 404]." 33 U.S.C. §
1344(f)(2) (1988).
183. "Draining activities destroy large amounts of wetlands." W. WANT, supra note 13, §
4.06(3). Most wetlands are lost through draining or excavation. Interview, supra note 171.
184. See Orleans Audubon Soc'y v. Lee, 742 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1984) (draining accom-
plished by constructing drainage culverts); Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 609
(N.D. Tex. 1990) (drainage accomplished with pumps).
In the case where drainage is accomplished by using canals, if a non-de minimis discharge is
found, the Corps will generally regulate the activity. Interview, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, in Chicago (Feb. 6, 1991).
185. See supra notes 84-120 and accompanying text (discussing what type of lands constitute
wetlands subject to Corps jurisdiction).
186. Such a dewatering was attempted in Save Our Community, where a land developer at-
tempted to pump the water out of a wetland and then sought a redetermination by the Corps.
Save Our Community, 741 F. Supp. at 609.
187. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
188. Id. However, the EPA and sometimes the Corps scrutinize the method of draining to
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The EPA guidelines appear to concur with this interpretation of the CWA.
The EPA guidelines refer exclusively to "discharges," "pollutants," and "con-
taminants."189 Similarly, the Corps' regulations are concerned entirely with
the activity of discharging material into the waters of the United States and
no mention is made of drainage of water. 90
The EPA, the Corps, and at least one federal appellate court support such a
restrictive reading of the CWA. In Orleans Audubon Society v. Lee,' 91 the
Fifth Circuit held that drainage activities on a wetland property were not reg-
ulated activities. 92 The case involved the Corps' decision not to require a per-
mit for the installation of two drainage culverts 93 on a tract of cypress-tupelo
gum wetlands in Louisiana.'' The owner of the tract, C.I.T. Corporation,
planned to convert the area for residential use by draining and then filling the
tract. 9 The Corps, upon an investigation of the activity being conducted on
the land, decided that the draining was not within its jurisdiction to regu-
late.'96 According to the Corps, the installation of the culverts did not involve
any discharge into the wetland.9 " The Audubon Society sued the Corps to
force them to take jurisdiction over the activity under the CWA.'98
The court in Orleans Audubon Society held that the installation of these
culverts to drain and thereby destroy the wetland area was not a regulated
activity.' 99 "Only clear water flowed into the drainage canal. Clear water is
not within the definition of a pollutant under the CWA. ' 200 The key to the
court's decision is the determination that the construction of a drainage canal
did not involve a discharge into the waters other than those characterized as
de minimis.2 ' The court noted in a footnote:
Orleans contends that the drainage is prohibited under this section [the re-
capture provision of 404(0(2)] because it is incidental to an activity which
protect against any regulated discharges that may occur along with the draining. W. WANT, supra
note 13, § 4.06(3).
189. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.1, 230.3(e), 230.3(o) (1990).
190. 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2, 323.3 (1990). The Corps, however, will regulate the installation of
drainage canals if the drainage is intended to convert the wetland to another use. Id. §
323.4(a)(I)(iii)(C)(I)(iv)(2).
191. 742 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1984).
192. Id. at 910-11.
193. Culverts are drainage canals that run across an area.
194. Orleans Audubon Soc'y, 742 F.2d at 903.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 910-11.
197. Id. at 904.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 910-11.
200. Id. at 910. "The term 'pollutant' means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue,
sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive
materials not covered by the Atomic Energy Act, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock,
sand, cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into the water." 40
C.F.R. § 230.3(o) (1990).
201. See Orleans Audubon Soc'y v. Lee, 742 F.2d 901, 906 (5th Cir. 1984).
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is intended to bring about the conversion of a wetland . . . into a non-wet-
land area which can then be developed into a residential area without gov-
ernmental approval. Although we are fully aware of this possibility, as is the
Corps, we cannot require the Corps to exercise a jurisdiction that it does not
possess. Section 404(f)(2) applies only when dredged or fill material has
been discharged, and water is simply not dredged or fill material.202
This position taken by the Corps, the EPA, and the Fifth Circuit has en-
couraged developers to drain wetlands as an alternative to applying for a sec-
tion 404 permit before filling a wetland. 03 The cost of this action is the con-
tinued destruction of an important, national environmental resource.
II. SAVE OUR COMMUNITY V. EPA: ONE COURT FLIES IN THE FACE OF
CONSENSUS
A recent federal district court decision has supplied a new interpretation of
the CWA as it relates to de-watering techniques. In Save Our Community v.
EPA,204 the court held that the draining of a wetland is a regulated activity
under the CWA where the draining is intended to alter significantly or destroy
the wetland.2 0 5
A. Facts
Waste Management, Inc., a waste removal company, owned and operated a
landfill project near Ferris, Texas.206 The landfill, commonly known as the
"Skyline Landfill," was seventy-three acres in area. 20 7 In January of 1989,
Waste Management submitted an application to the Texas Department of
Health that proposed to expand the Skyline Landfill from 73 to 310 acres. 8
In May of 1987, the company solicited an opinion from the Corps to deter-
mine if any of the proposed expansion included "waters of the United States"
and was, therefore, subject to the Corps' jurisdiction under section 404 of the
CWA.20 9 The Corps concluded that six or seven of the ponds on the site were
"waters of the United States" under the CWA.210
In response to the Corps' conclusion, Waste Management, in 1988, began to
drain the ponds through the use of a mechanical pump.211 Waste Manage-
ment's intention was to drain the ponds completely, thereby destroying all
202. id. at 910 n.16.
203. See, e.g., Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (Waste
Management drained a wetland instead of applying for a permit).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 615.
206. Id. at 608.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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plant and animal life dependent upon the wetland environment.212 Upon full
evaporation of the water in the wetland and the subsequent destruction of the
capacity of the land to support wetland ecology, Waste Management planned
to obtain a redetermination of the land's wetland status21 Once the Corps
determined that the area no longer constituted a wetland, Waste Management
planned to develop the land for additional landfill space, free from federal
regulation. 214
The Corps, the EPA, and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service were
all aware of this de-watering activity as it was occurring. 215 In fact, represent-
atives of Waste Management met with representatives from these agencies in
efforts to prevent any violation of the CWA.2 6 At no time was Waste Man-
agement informed of a need to file an application for a permit to drain the
ponds, nor did they do so on their own initiative.217 A suit was then filed by a
local community group, Save Our Community, pursuant to the citizen suit
provision of the CWA. 21 8
B. The Procedural Background of the Case
The plaintiff, Save Our Community, sued in federal court for a preliminary
injunction to halt Waste Management's de-watering of the ponds. 219 In addi-
tion, Save Our Community sued for a declaratory judgment that Waste Man-
agement violated section 404(b) of the CWA when it did not obtain a permit
for draining the ponds.220 Save Our Community also sought a declaration that
the EPA and the Corps had either (1) failed to perform their mandatory du-
ties under section 404(b), or (2) incorrectly interpreted the CWA by deter-
mining that draining or de-watering was not a regulated activity. 22' The de-
212. Id. at 609.
213. Id. at 615.
214. Id. at 609.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The provision reads: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen
may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . (1) against any person . . . alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter ..... 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a)(1) (1988).
219. Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 616 (N.D. Tex. 1990). The standard
used by the court for granting a preliminary injunction was that the plaintiff had to show:
(a) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
(b) a substantial threat that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is
not granted;
(c) that the threatened injury to the plaintiffs outweighs the damage that an injunc-
tion might cause to the defendants; and
(d) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Id. at 622 (citing Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 790-91 (5th
Cir. 1989)).
220. Id. at 607.
221. Id.
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fendant moved for dismissal, and the district court treated this as a motion for
summary judgment."
C. The Court Decision
The court held that draining or de-watering a wetland is a regulated activity
under the CWA where the draining is designed to significantly alter or destroy
a wetland.223 To support its holding, the court examined the CWA, its legisla-
tive history, its regulatory program, and the relevant case law. 224
1. The CWA and Its Legislative History
First, the court ruled that the text and legislative history of the CWA indi-
cated an expansive protection of wetlands. 22 The court's analysis of the Act
centered around the section 404(b) permit requirement2 26 and the expansion of
the scope of the permit provision to include the protection of wetlands.122 The
court found that Congress intended an expansive reach for the section 404(b)
permit requirement and cited several cases in support. 2 6
2. The Corps' Regulations
The court next looked to the regulations promulgated by the Corps and the
EPA that govern the application of the CWA.2 19 The court pointed out that
these regulations are highly concerned with the "degradation or destruction of
valuable aquatic sites like wetlands. 220 Also mentioned in a footnote of the
opinion was the "recapture provision, ' 221 which requires a permit for any of
222. Id. at 609 n.l.
223. Id. at 615.
224. Id. The court stated that "as a matter of law ... pursuant to the Clean Water Act, its
regulations, and relevant case law § 404(b) of the Act requires a permit where draining or de-
watering a wetland presents the threat of significant alteration or destruction of the wetland." Id.
225. Id. at 611-12.
226. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1988).
227. Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 611-12 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
228. Id. at 611-12, 614 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 139
(1985) (finding that the CWA is a comprehensive act and, therefore, must not be limited in
application)); see also Creppel v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 500 F. Supp. 1108, I115
(E.D. La. 1980) (finding that an interpretation of § 404 as an environmental protection statute is
consistent with congressional intent), rev'd on other grounds, 670 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1982); Avoy-
elles Sportsmen's League v. Alexander ("Avoyelles I"), 473 F. Supp. 525, 533 (W.D. La. 1979)
("A basic policy of the FWPCA is the protection of our nation's wetlands and the important
functions they serve. The legislative history of the Clean Water Act . . . reflects an abiding con-
gressional concern with the functional importance of wetlands."), later proceeding, 511 F. Supp.
278 (W.D. La. 1981), afid in part and revd in part sub nom. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
229. Save Our Community. 741 F. Supp. at 612-13.
230. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(d) (1989)).
231. Id. at 612 n.10; see supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text (discussing the recapture
provision).
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the expressly exempted activities where those activities convert a water of the
United States into a different use.282 The court implied that such a provision
indicated the wide range of activities that fall under the scope of section
404(b).2 33 The court acknowledged, however, that the Act and its regulations
focus primarily on discharges. 8 Therefore, the court's main argument cen-
tered around the case law that has developed concerning the issue of activities
prohibited under the CWA.288
3. The District Court's Analysis of Relevant Case Law
The district court in Save Our Community v. EPA analogized to Fifth Cir-
cuit case law to support its conclusion that activities which are intended to
significantly alter or destroy a wetland require a permit under the CWA.286 In
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh ("Avoyelles JII"),287 the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that land-clearing activities, when accompanied by a redeposit-
ing of materials into the wetland, are subject to the section 404(b) permit
process.2 38 These land-clearing activities were held to be regulated because the
work being conducted was intended to permanently change the status of the
area from a wetland to a non-wetland.28 9 In applying the reasoning of the
Avoyelles III court, the court in Save Our Community v. EPA held that
Waste Management's pumping required a permit under section 404(b) of the
CWA.2 ,0 In so holding, the court reasoned that Waste Management's clear
intent was to destroy the wetland through pumping.2 ' Therefore, the court
concluded that the Avoyelles III rationale supported its holding.
The court also relied on Creppel v. United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers22 as support for its conclusion. 48 In Creppel, a federal district court
held that a permit proceeding was required for a land reclamation project that
would significantly damage a wetland by closing a canal and operating a
pumping station.24 ' The Creppel court agreed with the interpretations of the
EPA and the Corps that section 404 was an "environmental protection stat-
232. Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 612 n.8 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 613-14. The court notes that "[miuch of the debate over the scope of § 404(b) has
centered on whether the particular activity challenged involves a discharge of dredged or fill mate-
rial into a protected water body." Id.
236. Id. at 613-15.
237. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
238. Id. at 923-24.
239. The Fifth Circuit, in Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, held that certain land-clearing
activities did not require application of the § 404(b) process. 711 F.2d 634, 647 (5th Cir. 1983).
The Fifth Circuit distinguished this case from Avoyelles III by pointing out that in Avoyelles I11,
the land-clearing activities were meant to destroy the wetland. Id.
240. Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 615 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
241. Id.
242. 500 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. La. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 670 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1982).
243. See Save Our Community, 741 F. Supp. at 614.
244. Creppel, 500 F. Supp. at 1115.
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ute." '245 The Creppel court expressed its belief that such an interpretation was
"reasonable and consistent with the Congressional purpose" behind the
CWA.24
6
The Save Our Community v. EPA court similarly concluded that Congress
intended section 404 to be interpreted as an environmental protection stat-
ute."47 The court summarized its position by stating, "It would seem to stand
logic on its head . . . to permit a landowner to avoid the 404(b) process by
completely draining a wetland and then claiming 'Permit for what wet-
land?' ,148 Consequently, because Waste Management had significantly de-
watered the ponds with the intent to destroy them,24 8 the court enjoined Waste
Management from draining, dredging, building on, discharging into, or other-
wise altering the ponds on the proposed expansion to the Skyline Landfill. 50
III. ANALYSIS
The court in Save Our Community v. EPA adopted a minority position. The
Corps and the EPA currently interpret section 404(b) as not requiring a party
to obtain a permit before draining a wetland. 51 The Fifth Circuit further en-
trenched this view in Orleans Audubon Society v. Lee252 when it held that
draining a wetland was not a regulated activity under the CWA.25
This Comment contends that the position adopted by the court in Save Our
Community v. EPA represents the better view regarding the draining and fill-
ing issue. Nonetheless, the decision is open to criticism. This Comment takes
issue with the court's failure to provide a strong enough analytical foundation
for future courts to follow. The court's arguments as to why the pumping of
water from a wetland requires a section 404 permit were premised largely
upon the general assertion that any activity which threatens a wetland must be
regulated. 54 Thus, the court's primary rationale rested on the policy ramifica-
tions of not regulating the pumping of water from a wetland.
This Comment contends that the court failed to recognize a number of
stronger, textual arguments for why de-watering activity is covered under the
CWA and, in particular, the permit provision of section 404. Such additional
arguments are necessary in light of the strong opposition to the minority posi-
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 614-15 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
248. Id. at 615.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 617.
251. See id. at 609 (noting that the Corps and the EPA determined "that they [did] not have
the legal jurisdiction or authority to require a permit where the only activity conducted on a
legally-designated wetland is draining or dewatering").
252. 742 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1984).
253. In Orleans Audubon Society, the Fifth Circuit held that draining water is not a regulated
activity under the CWA. Id. at 910 n.16; see supra notes 191-203 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the holding in Orleans).
254. Orleans Audubon Socy, 742 F.2d at 910 n.16.
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tion taken by the court in Save Our Community v. EPA and the importance of
urging future courts to adopt the court's ultimate conclusion.
The following sections address these sounder, more text-oriented arguments
in support of the ultimate conclusion reached by the court in Save Our Com-
munity v. EPA. These arguments build upon two general issues: (1) whether
the CWA, as written, regulates the de-watering of a wetland, and (2) even if
the CWA does not regulate draining per se, whether the CWA regulates the
filling of a previously drained wetland. The Analysis section concludes that a
party can neither de-water a wetland nor fill a previously drained wetland
under the CWA without first obtaining a section 404 permit.
A. Draining Is Covered by the CWA
Draining a wetland, usually through the use of pumping equipment, is a
regulated activity under the CWA. Although the EPA, the Corps, and the
Fifth Circuit disagree with this proposition,255 two arguments support such a
claim. First, draining activities are subject to the permit process of section 404
because virtually always, draining a wetland is merely the first part in the
process of filling and developing the wetland area. Second, draining activities
are subject to the permit process because draining activities involve a dis-
charge into a wetland and are, therefore, subject to regulation under the
CWA. Unfortunately, no court has addressed these particular arguments. As a
result, the EPA and the Corps continue to allow parties to eviscerate the text
and underlying goals of the CWA. Moreover, parties continue to destroy acres
of environmentally valuable wetlands, free of governmental regulation. This
Comment contends that future courts which address these two arguments
presented below will find that draining is expressly subject to regulation under
the CWA. By so concluding, the court would require any party who desired to
drain a wetland to first obtain a permit from the Corps.
1. Pumping Water and Filling Are Two Parts of a Single Action
Before discussing the particular reasons why draining a wetland is covered
by the permit provision of the CWA, it is necessary to explain the typical
method used by a party who desires to avoid the permit process through drain-
ing. The preliminary step is to dry the wetland, usually through the use of a
pump or other de-watering technique. After pumping the wetland dry, the
party applies for a redetermination of the wetland's status under the CWA.
Since the pumping destroys the area's wetland characteristics, the Corps rule
that the CWA does not apply because the area in question no longer consti-
tutes a wetland.2 56 Consequently, the party is free to fill the previously drained
255. See supra notes 183-203 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of draining wetlands
and its tolerance by the regulating agencies and the courts).
256. Cf Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 609 (N.D. Tex. 1990). In Save Our
Community, the Corps and the EPA determined "that they do not have the legal jurisdiction or
authority to require a permit where the only activity conducted on a legally designated wetland is
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wetland, free from any federal regulation under the CWA. Thus, by not filling
in the wetland directly, which would require a permit under the Act, the party
avoids the permit process altogether.
The court in Save Our Community v. EPA took a minority position, holding
that such a scheme may be regulated by the CWA.257 The court's reasoning,
however, was based largely on policy. In particular, the court stated that "to
allow the draining of ponds and the redetermination of the site as a non-wet-
land would 'permit the very evil that the regulation is intended to prevent: the
destruction of wetlands to eliminate the permit requirement'."' 58 Therefore,
the court concluded that a permit was needed before any draining could take
place.
The court's ultimate holding in Save Our Community v. EPA is commenda-
ble. The court, however, failed to address a number of stronger, more convinc-
ing arguments for applying the permit process of the CWA applies in these
draining and filling cases. In particular, the regulatory agencies and the courts
have ignored the "reality of the situation" by artificially segregating and per-
ceiving the defendants' actions as two unrelated activities: draining and filling.
Such a position represents an unduly myopic characterization of the draining
and filling scheme.
The reality of the situation is that the pumping or de-watering of a wetland
is a preliminary, necessary component in an overriding effort to fill and de-
velop a wetland.25 9 Very seldom, if ever, would a party drain a wetland with-
out having the intent to develop it later through filling. There is no commercial
value in an undeveloped wetland. Therefore, because pumping is such a neces-
sary element in the endeavor to fill, pumping and filling must be treated func-
tionally as one act. Filling is, of course, prohibited under the Act without first
obtaining a permit.2 60 However, unless courts first require a permit for the
initial draining of a wetland, no permit is required for the destruction of the
wetland. Such a result is clearly contrary to the mandate of the CWA to pro-
tect the nation's waters.261 Accordingly, future courts must perceive the act of
draining a wetland and subsequently filling its aftermath as two steps in one
process, which requires a permit from the onset.
By requiring a permit for the initial pumping, the fact that the pumping
activity results in a nominal or de minimis discharge becomes irrelevant. Sec-
tion 404 is satisfied because the latter act of filling clearly amounts to a "dis-
draining or dewatering." Id.; see also supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text (discussing "wa-
ters of the United States" jurisdiction as it pertains to the CWA).
257. Save Our Community, 741 F. Supp. at 615.
258. Id. (quoting Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 717 F.
Supp. 1417, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1988)).
259. See, e.g., id. (noting that Waste Management significantly drained the ponds and intended
to continue to pump them and destroy the capacity of the ponds to sustain life).
260. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
261. Id. § 1251. The goal of the CWA is to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of our Nation's waters." Id.
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charge of a pollutant" under section 301 of the CWA.262
The current regulatory program concerning the pumping of wetlands is un-
satisfactory. This regulatory program permits a party to fill a wetland in one
of two ways. A party can either (1) submit to the permit process under section
404 before filling the wetland, or (2) destroy the wetland by pumping it dry,
thereby avoiding the jurisdiction of section 404 altogether, and then fill the
land free of any regulatory impediment. With the risk and expense inherent in
the permit process, it is little wonder that most parties have and will continue
to opt for the latter alternative. This alternative of draining and then filling,
however, eviscerates the mandate of the CWA. Consequently, the regulatory
program must be changed and future courts must not adopt this approach.
Rather, such schemes must be subject to the jurisdiction and permit require-
ment of the Act.
Perceiving the draining and filling scheme as two parts of a single action,
instead of mutually exclusive acts, promotes Congress' articulated goals. The
ultimate goal of the CWA is to restore and maintain the quality of the na-
tion's waters. 6 The approach suggested in this Comment accomplishes this
goal by closing a judicially created loophole in the Act and regulating an oth-
erwise destructive activity. Another advantage of this approach is that by re-
quiring a landowner to obtain a permit for pumping water from a wetland, the
Corps can halt filling activities before they take place. Such a policy would
further the efficient administration of the CWA and also prevent unnecessary,
unregulated, and unjustifiable loss of valuable wetland resources.
A perceived inadequacy with the two parts of a single action approach theo-
retically exists if a defendant can establish that he has no intent to fill the
wetland after draining it. If a defendant could prove this,264 the party would
be permitted to drain the wetland without a permit and thereby destroy it. As
mentioned above, however, it is unlikely that a party would desire to drain a
wetland for the mere sake of draining it. Therefore, the approach is sound.
However, even if a court finds an inadequacy with this theory, another more
textual argument exists which demonstrates that the CWA, as written, re-
quires a party to obtain a permit before any draining activity can take place
on a wetland.
2. Statutory Basis for Requiring a Permit to De-water a Wetland
Another argument that draining a wetland requires a permit under the
CWA is purely textual in nature. Section 301 of the CWA provides that it
"shall be unlawful" for any party to place the "discharge of any pollutant"
262. See id. § 1311.
263. See id. § 1251(a) (prohibiting discharges into navigable waters).
264. This Comment contends that the defendant should have the burden of proving that its
draining activities are unrelated to any future filling plans. The defendant would be in the best
position to prove such a claim. Furthermore, because it is so unlikely that a party would drain a
wetland without intending to fill the area later, shifting the burden of proof is justified.
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into the waters of the United States without first receiving a permit.2 6 Since
the use of a pump involves a discharge of a pollutant, however minimal, the
CWA applies, and a permit prior to any pumping is required. More generally,
this argument-also applies to similar de-watering techniques.
In establishing the merit of this argument, it is necessary to define a number
of critically relevant statutory terms. The CWA defines "discharge of a pollu-
tant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.266 With respect to the term "addition," at least one court has recog-
nized that "the word 'addition' as used in the definition of 'discharge' may
reasonably be understood to include 'redeposit[ing]' of material already ex-
isting in the wetland. 2 67 Furthermore, with respect to the term "pollutant,"
the EPA defines "pollutant" as including "wrecked or discarded equip-
ment. '2 68 Moreover, the EPA defines "pollution" as "man-made or man-influ-
enced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, or radiological integrity
of an aquatic ecosystem."269
Because the draining process causes a discharge of pollutants into the wet-
land, these rules and definitions mandate the conclusion that draining a wet-
land is an activity that is subject to regulation under the CWA. Additionally,
the installation of a pumping unit and necessary equipment is a discharge it-
self because it is virtually identical to the addition of "wrecked or discarded
equipment" which is clearly covered by the Act.2 70 Finally, it is undisputable
that the installation of de-watering devices on a wetland is a manmade altera-
tion of the wetland's "physical [and] biological . . . integrity. 271 Therefore,
the draining of a wetland involves a discharge of a pollutant into the wetland
and requires a section 404 permit.
There is no merit to any contention that the placement of a pumping unit
and its attachments on a wetland is temporary, and therefore, distinguishable
from discarded equipment on a wetland. While pumping equipment is not in-
tended to remain on a wetland, the effects of its presence may be substantial.
Functionally, it may be more destructive for the wetland to place a pumping
unit there than to discard equipment in the wetland. Therefore, the Corps
should treat a party who places pumps, hoses, and other de-watering tools on a
wetland in the same manner as it treats individuals who discard equipment on
a wetland.27 2 Accordingly, the Corps should require a party to obtain a permit
265. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (1988). The prohibition against discharging pollutants into the wa-
ters of the United States is not absolute. Section 401 of the CWA allows the EPA and the Corps
to issue permits for dredged and fill material. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the Corps' permit power).
266. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1988).
267. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh ("Avoyelles II1"), 715 F.2d 897, 923 (5th Cir.
1983).
268. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(o) (1990).
269. Id. § 230.3(p).
.270. Id. § 230.3(o) (defining the term "pollutant").
271. See id. § 230.3(p) (defining the word "pollution").
272. Construing the term "pollutant" to include the placement of equipment into a wetland is
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before it installs de-watering tools on a wetland.
While the physical presence of pumping equipment on a wetland constitutes
a discharge regulated by the CWA, the act of installing a pump also causes
another type of discharge which is subject to regulation. This discharge is the
disturbance of soil, vegetation, or other debris that the placement of a pump
on a wetland causes.2 3 The Avoyelles III court explicitly recognized that this
"redepositing" constituted a discharge of a pollutant under the Act . 74 Such
redepositing is clearly "pollution" under the Act since it is a "man-made or
man-influenced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, or radiological
integrity of an aquatic ecosystem. "7 5 In Save Our Community v. EPA, the
court agreed, concluding that the installation of a pumping device into wet-
lands involved "[s]ome minor discharges. 1 7 6 Therefore, the shifting or rede-
positing of material already present on the wetland, caused by the installation
of de-watering equipment, requires a permit under the Act.
Such an interpretation of "discharge of a pollutant" is consonant with the
purpose and legislative history of the CWA. The legislative history makes
clear that the protection of wetlands is necessary to achieve the CWA's
broader goal of "restor[ing] and maintain[ing]" the integrity of the nation's
waters.2 7 7 If redepositing material on the wetland will have the same deleteri-
ous effect on the wetland as adding pollutants, then redepositing must be cov-
ered under the CWA.27 8
In sum, due to the physical realities of placing a pumping apparatus on a
wetland, a discharge of some proportion is invariably going to occur. The dis-
charge can be viewed as deriving from the incidental discharge associated with
the operation of the pump, or the pumping equipment itself. In either case, a
discharge has occurred on a wetland area under the jurisdiction of the Corps,
reasonable in light of the express intent of the CWA to protect wetlands from destruction. See
supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of § 404); see also
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985). The Riverside Court stated,
"An agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is
reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 131 (citing Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (interpreting
the prohibition against pollutants to exclude equipment placed into a wetland would run counter
to the expressed intent of Congress to use the CWA to promote wetland conservation)).
273. The discharge that accompanies the placement of pumping equipment into a wetland is
analogous to the discharge found with land-clearing activities. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League
v. Marsh ("Avoyelles 111"), 715 F.2d 897, 922 (5th Cir. 1983). In Avoyelles 111. the Fifth Circuit
found that bulldozers and backhoes used to remove vegetation were "point sources" of pollution
because some of the material moved "may ultimately have found its way back into the waters."
Id. While the potential for large amounts of discharge is arguably less for pumping activities than
land-clearing, a discharge or redeposit of material of some sort is still inevitable with the installa-
tion of a pump.
274. Id. at 923.
275. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(p) (1990).
276. Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 609 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
277. See supra notes 51-54 (discussing the legislative history of the CWA).
278. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh ("Avoyelles II1"), 715 F.2d 897, 923 (5th
Cir. 1983).
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and the permit process of section 404 is invoked.
On the other hand, if a future court determines that the jurisdiction of the
CWA fails to attach to de minimis discharges, then arguably, a party would
not need a permit to de-water a wetland. No consensus currently exists regard-
ing the validity of a de minimis discharge exception under the CWA. This
Comment contends that the increasing number of courts that have rejected the
de minimis exception have articulated the better view. 2 9
The EPA and the Corps, in addition to a number of courts, support the
notion of a de minimis exception.280 This exception allows a party to discharge
de minimis amounts of pollution, which would otherwise be subject to regula-
tion, into a wetland without obtaining a Corps permit.281 The parties that es-
pouse this view premise it upon the minimal impact of such discharges and the
seeming support for the exception in the exemptions listed in the Act.282
Such a view, however, is contrary to the language and history of the CWA,
as well as sound environmental policy. The CWA, in section 301, explicitly
prohibits "any discharge" by "any person."2 83 Following this aggressive prohi-
bition of any and all discharges are standards and procedures for controlling
the emission of pollutants into the waters of the United States. 8" Nowhere in
these standards and procedures is there mention of a de minimis discharge
exception to the prohibition of pollutant emissions.285 Further, there is no ex-
press congressional intent to exempt de minimis discharges.28
Finally, the acceptance of a de minimis exception promotes bad environ-
mental policy because it potentially stunts the application of the provisions and
objectives of the CWA.2 87 It is clear that if the pumping of a wetland, with the
intent to alter it significantly and later fill it, were considered a de minimis
discharge, then the fundamental objectives of the CWA would be severely
frustrated.
279. See id. at 919 n.37 (noting that the Corps and not the discharger must determine if a
discharge is de minimis); Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 625-27,
(8th Cir. 1979) (rejecting the significant alteration standard adopted by the district court); Reid
v. Marsh, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (following the Minnehaha
holding).
280. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(d) (1990) (stating that the Corps' regulations state that discharge
of dredged material "does not include de minimis incidental soil movement occurring during nor-
mal dredging operations"); see also Office of the Chief of Engineers Regulatory Guidance Letter
81-4 (1982) (creating a de minimis exception for discharges, such as drippings from a bucket,
which occur during normal dredging operations).
281. See sources cited supra note 280.
282. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(")(1) (1988). Such an exception for de minimis discharges is not
surprising given that historically the Corps' primary purpose was the development of this nation's
land and resources.
283. Id. § 1311(a).
284. Id. §§ 1311 (b)-(m), 1316(a)-(e).
285. See id.
286. Id. §§ 1341-1344.
287. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing the intent of Congress to pre-
serve wetlands with the enactment of the CWA).
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Several courts have recognized the compelling reasons to reject a de
minimis exception to section 404.288 These courts have called into question the
Corps' use of the de minimis exception to decline to assert jurisdiction over a
particular activity. The Eighth Circuit, for example, in Minnehaha Creek Wa-
tershed District v. Hoffman, 89 concluded that with respect to a small dis-
charge of soil into a wetland, there is "no justification in the Act for the...
conclusion that a significant alteration in water quality must be demonstrated
before the addition of a particular substance to navigable waters can be classi-
fied as the discharge of a pollutant."2 90 The Fifth Circuit, as well, appears to
agree with this reasoning, viewing the proper course for the Corps as one of
exercising jurisdiction over the discharging activity and then deciding if a per-
mit should be granted. 9 1 These courts stress that the policy behind, and the
language of, the CWA do not tolerate an exception for de minimis dis-
charges.2 92 Thus, it is clear that neither the CWA, its legislative history, its
underlying objectives, nor a growing number of courts support a de minimis
exception to the Act's permit requirement.
However, even if a de minimis exception is needed for certain low-impact or
nominal discharges, such a rationale does not apply to pumping. When the
intent of the activity which causes the discharge is to destroy a wetland, as it
almost always will be with pumping,2 98 the Act's continued vitality requires
that such activity be subject to the permit process of section 404.294 In Save
Our Community v. EPA, for example, Waste Management intended to pump
dry the wetlands in question so as to avoid the permit requirements for fill-
ing.295 After the wetland became dry and the vegetation withered, Waste
288. See supra note 175.
289. 597 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1979).
290. Id. at 626-27. The court went on to criticize the Corps' reluctance to maintain jurisdiction
over the discharge because "tihe Act contains no provision that the listed substances are to be
classified as pollutants, only upon a further administrative of judicial finding that their addition to
navigable waters results in a significant decrease in water quality." Id. at 627.
291. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh ("Avoyelles 111"), 715 F.2d 897, 919-20 (5th Cir.
1983); see also Reid v. Marsh, 20 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (holding
that de minimis discharges are not exempted from the § 404 permit program).
292. See Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist., 597 F.2d at 625 (stating that the district court
interpreted the scope of the exceptions to the Act too narrowly and that the overriding goal of the
Act is to maintain the integrity of the nation's waters).
In overturning the Corps' de minimis exception, these courts must find that the regulations are
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law," or fail to
meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (1988). Evi-
dently, these courts find that the de minimis exception is not in accordance with the statutory
scheme of the CWA. See Reid v. Marsh, 20 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ohio
1984).
293. See, e.g., Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 615 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (finding
that Waste Management's intent of pumping to be destruction of the pond's retention capacity).
294. See 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(2) (1988).
295. See Save Our Community, 741 F. Supp. at 609, 615; supra notes 212-14 and accompany-
ing text.
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Management planned to convert the site from a wetland to a garbage fill. 296
Exempting such a scheme under a de minimis exception eviscerates the funda-
mental operation of the CWA. Therefore, it is evident that in the context of
de-watering a wetland, the use of a de minimis exception is indefensible, and
any argument to the contrary must fail.
The court's position in Save Our Community v. EPA, that the de minimis
exception did not apply to pumping activities, was largely based on a policy
argument. The court should have presented a more textually premised and
forceful argument for why the de minimis exception was inapplicable. Such an
argument can be premised upon the Act's "recapture provision." '' This Com-
ment contends that future courts should use this argument in addition to the
policy arguments presented by the court in Save Our Community v. EPA.
The recapture provision in the CWA states that "[a]ny discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters incidental to any activity"
that converts a wetland requires a permit. 98 The text of this provision indi-
cates that the Corps must enforce the permit process of section 404 for all
projects which involve a discharge intended to convert a "water of the United
States" into a different use.2 99
Most courts tend to interpret the recapture provision as broadly as its lan-
guage appears. 300 In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh ("Avoyelles
II"),"'1 for instance, the Fifth Circuit applied the recapture provision to dis-
charges caused by land-clearing activities 30 2 Although the discharges them-
selves did not substantially damage the wetland, the court held that the land-
clearing activity required a permit because the activity was intended to con-
vert the wetland to farming acreage. 03 The Avoyelles III court's reading of
the recapture provision is the correct interpretation: even if a de minimis ex-
ception exists, the absolute prohibition of discharges in the recapture provision
should apply in those cases where a party engaging in discharge intends to
convert a wetland into a non-wetland.
Courts, however, generally apply the recapture provision only to those activ-
ities that are explicitly mentioned in the exemptions section of the CWA, sec-
tion 404(f)(1).30" Such limited application is not surprising because the recap-
ture provision is located under the exceptions subsection of the statute entitled
296. See Save Our Community, 742 F. Supp. at 609.
297. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (1988).
298. Id. (emphasis added).
299. Id.
300. See supra note 156 (listing cases that support this proposition).
301. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
302. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1176 (D. Mass. 1986)
(stating that "even if [the defendant] could establish that it is exempt from the permit require-
ments under § 1344(")(I), it must also demonstrate that its activities avoid 'recapture' under the
provisions of [§ 404(f)(2)]"), afftd, 826 F.2d 1151 (Ist Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061
( 1988); see supra note 154 (listing the exceptions in § 404(")(I)).
1094 [Vol. 40:1059
EVADING WETLANDS JURISDICTION
"Non-prohibited discharge of dredged or fill material."' 0 5 Since draining and
pumping are not activities listed as exempt under this subsection,806 one may
argue that the recapture provision cannot apply to these activities. Conse-
quently, if the recapture provision only applies to the listed exempt activities,
draining cannot be "recaptured," and it is an activity falling outside the pur-
view of the Act.
This argument, however, ultimately fails. The contention that the recapture
provision should be read narrowly so as to apply only to the articulated exemp-
tions listed in section 404(f)(1) is erroneous because such a position requires
an inconsistent reading of section 404(f) as a whole.307 Section 404(f)(1) sets
forth the exemptions to the section 404 permit process explicitly and in a nar-
row manner.308 Each-exemption is defined in detail and limited to a very par-
ticular activity. Yet, the Corps implies from this narrow language the power to
exempt all de minimis discharges, even though such an exemption is clearly
not listed.3 0 9 Therefore, the Corps broadly interprets section 404(f)(1) so as to
infer a power to exempt de minimis discharges from the section 404 permit
process.
Thus, for the Corps to contend that the recapture provision in section
404(0(2) should be read narrowly, and therefore, only apply to explicit section
404(0(1) exemptions, represents an inconsistent interpretation of section
404(). Furthermore, such a narrow interpretation is contrary to the clear
wording of section 404(0(2). The recapture provision does not qualify its
scope to exempt activities only. Rather, the language is very broad, encom-
passing all activities which include a discharge.3 1 0 The provision indicates that
even if the discharge is de minimis, the activity should be regulated. The lan-
guage "any discharge" certainly does not condone an interpretation which al-
lows a de minimis discharge incidental to the destruction of a wetland. There-
fore, the Corps must end its inconsistent interpretation of section 404(f)." By
305. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1988). Section 1344(0(1) is a list of the exempt activities, while
§ 1344(0(2) is the recapture provision. See id.
306. See id. § 1344(f)(1).
307. See id. § 1344(f).
308. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
310. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (1988). The provision states that "[any activity having as its
purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject
• . .shall be required to have a permit under [§ 404]." Id. The repeated use of the word "any" in
the provision indicates an expansive zone of coverage.
311. The Corps' interpretation of § 404 is full of inconsistencies. See Tripp & Herz, supra note
55, at 238-39. The Corps has expansively read the specific exemptions under the Act to grant
itself the power to exclude de minimis discharges caused by nonexempt activities. This interpreta-
tion is not supported by any section of the CWA. Yet the Corps refuses to abide by the plain
wording of the "recapture provision" to include all discharges that cause a change in use of a
wetland. In the alternative, if the Corps continues to read the "recapture provision" very narrowly,
then the Corps should also limit itself to applying a de minimis standard only to exempted activi-
ties. Id. at 239. Such a view, of course would render all discharges, however minimal, subject to a
§ 404 permit. Consequently, draining would also be covered under this alternative. Indeed, the
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so doing, the Corps could still recognize a de minimis exception but recapture
those "de minimis" activities that significantly threaten a wetland's viability,
such as draining. Consequently, draining would be covered by the Act and
require a section 404 permit.
In sum, the draining of a wetland is covered by the CWA. Two arguments
support such a conclusion. First, pumping water from a wetland cannot be
considered separately from subsequently filling the dehydrated area. If a court
perceives the draining and filling scheme as two parts of a single action, a
finding of jurisdiction under the CWA becomes relatively simple. Second,
draining is also covered under the CWA because de-watering activities cause a
discharge of a pollutant into a wetland. Moreover, any contention that a de
minimis exception applies to draining fails from both a textual and policy per-
spective. Accordingly, future courts must require any party who desires to de-
water or drain a wetland to obtain a permit first from the Corps, pursuant to
section 404.
B. Even if Draining Per Se is Not Covered Under the Act, the CWA
Requires a Permit Before a Party Can Fill a Previously Drained Wetland
The contention above is that draining, per se, is an activity which is subject
to regulation under the CWA. However, even if future courts reject the argu-
ments in support of this position, other arguments exist that, if adopted, would
require a party to obtain a section 404 permit before filling a previously
drained wetland. Neither the Corps nor the courts have adopted such a posi-
tion. Rather, the view adopted by the Corps is that no wetland exists after
draining,312 and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the CWA fails to attach. This
Comment contends that such a position represents a faulty reading of the defi-
nition of a wetland.
The regulatory definition of a wetland supports the conclusion that pumping
a wetland fails to change its legal status under the CWA. Specifically, the
"normal circumstances" factor, and other definitional aspects of a wetland,
support such a view. Consequently, because the legal status of a wetland area
under the Act is not changed after dehydration, any party who desires to fill a
previously drained wetland must obtain a section 404 permit before doing so.
A wetland is defined as "[t]hose areas that are inundated or saturated...
at a frequency and duration to support, and that under normal circumstances,
do support, a prevalence" of wetland vegetation."' 3 In a series of Regulatory
Guidance Letters ("RGLs") to clarify the meaning of the phrase "under nor-
mal circumstances," the Corps stated that the intention behind this phrase was
to exclude "abnormal situations" from the wetland determination process.3""
Corps has broadened the exemptions and limited the recapture provision when the language of the
Act does not expressly support either interpretation.
312. See Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 609 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
313. Id. (emphasis added).
314. Corps RGL No. 86-9, supra note 127.
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The Corps also stated that the "primary consideration" in determining
whether an area qualified as a wetland "under normal circumstances [was] the
extent and relative permanence of the physical alteration of wetlands hydrol-
ogy and hydrophytic vegetation. 3 13
Of greater import, however, was the Corps' desire to give attention to the
purpose and cause of any physical alteration to hydrology or vegetation in
determining whether a disturbed area was entitled to wetland status 16 One of
the "abnormal" situations offered as an example was where an individual
seeks to avoid the permit process by destroying the wetland vegetation on a
parcel of property."1 Since a critical aspect of wetlands determinations is the
vegetation requirement,3 1 8 some clever owners of wetland property sought to
skirt the CWA by destroying the wetland plant life.319 The Corps, in its RGL,
explicitly sought to eliminate this loophole.3 20 In so doing, the Corps
concluded:
areas where individuals have destroyed hydrophytic vegetation in an attempt
to eliminate the regulatory requirements of section 404 remain part of the
overall aquatic system, and are subject to regulation under section 404. In
such a case, where the Corps can determine or reasonably infer that the
purpose of the physical disturbance to hydrophytic vegetation was to avoid
regulation, the Corps will continue to assert section 404 jurisdiction.3"
Two aspects of the definition of wetland and the explanation in the RGL of
the "under normal circumstances" factor indicate that pumping the water out
315. Corps RGL No 90-7, supra note 129. The letter states, "The primary consideration in
determining whether a disturbed area qualifies as a section 404 wetland 'under normal circum-
stances' involves an evaluation of the extent and relative permanence of the physical alteration of
wetlands hydrology and hydrophytic vegetation." Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
319. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh ("Avoyelles I1"), 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1983). In Avoyelles III, the defendant landowners argued that their land-clearing activities on a
wetland were "normal" farming activities under the statutory exemptions of the CWA. Id. at 925.
The defendants had cleared a wetland of vegetation in order to convert the wetland into land
suitable for farming. Id. at 901. Under the statutory exemptions to the § 404 permit, certain
farming activities such as plowing, seeding, minor drainage, and harvesting are excluded from the
permit process. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0(1) (1988)). While the court acknowledged that
these exemptions exist, it held that the land-clearing was a regulated activity. Id. at 927. The
same result occurred in United States v. Larkins, where the court held that the "silviculture ex-
ception contained in 33 U.S.C § 1344 (f)(1)(A) applies to only the normal harvesting of timber
'to permanently change the area from wetlands into a non-wetland agricultural tract for row crop
cultivation.'" United States v. Larkin, 852 F.2d 189, 192 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 926 n.46 (5th Cir. 1983)), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1016 (1989). Therefore, in much the same way that the clearing activities in
Larkins and Avoyelles III were considered abnormal due to their effect on a wetland, so too
should pumping activities be seen as abnormal circumstances.
320. See Corps RGL No. 86-9, supra note 127 and accompanying text; Corps RGL No. 90-7,
supra note 129 and accompanying text.
321. Corps RGL No. 90-7 supra note 129 (emphasis added).
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of a wetland should not affect an area's legal designation as a wetland.3 22
First, the Corps is concerned with excluding the effects of disturbances that
normally do not occur on a wetland . 23 Second, the Corps also is concerned
with preventing activities which allow a landowner to bypass the section 404
permit process. From these concerns, one can only conclude that de-watering
techniques are not activities which may alter the status of a wetland under the
CWA.
Artificial pumping cannot be said to occur "normally" on a wetland. Cer-
tainly, periods of drought can occur in these areas, even to the point of com-
pletely destroying the wetland ecology.32 4 Such natural drought, however, can-
not be compared to the artificial de-watering of a wetland through the use of a
mechanical pump or other technique .1 2 The Act is concerned with regulating
human interference with waters of the United States. 26 Clearly, any pur-
poseful human intervention that seeks to destroy a wetland is not a normal
circumstance. If the "under normal circumstances" language is to have any
meaning, it must apply to exclude past dehydration activity from having any
influence on a wetland determination.
Second, the de-watering of a wetland area cannot alter the status of a wet-
land because such an activity is a blatant attempt to avoid the permit process
of the CWA. The Corps, in its RGL, expressed a desire to exclude activities
that could effectively emasculate the permit process. 27 The Corps asserted
that it would retain jurisdiction over a destroyed wetland if the agency deter-
mined that the purpose or intent of the "physical disturbance to hydrophytic
vegetation" was to avoid wetlands jurisdiction.32 8 Clearly, parties who drain
wetlands prior to filling do so to avoid the permit process of section 404. Just
as land-clearing activities were found to be within the purview of the Corps'
jurisdiction in Avoyelles 111, 329 the Corps must disregard any effect that drain-
ing may have on an area when deciding whether the area to be filled is a
"wetland" under the CWA.
In terms of each activity's evasive characteristics, vegetation clearing and
water pumping are similar, and therefore, the Corps must treat them the
same. As it stands, the Corps has failed to acknowledge that the most effective
322. See id.
323. See id. (noting that "normal circumstances" is based upon soil characteristics to the ex-
tent that hydrophytic vegetation would return when the disturbance ceases).
324. See supra note 6 (discussing the drought in Florida).
325. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977). Federal regulations state that "water moves in hydraulic
cycles." Id. A purely natural water cycle, like wetland water cycles, does not entail a purely
human created movement such as pumping or draining. Id.
326. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(p) (1990). The term "pollutant" is defined by EPA regulations as
any "man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological or radiological
integrity of an aquatic ecosystem." Id.
327. See Corps RGL No. 90-7, supra note 129.
328. Id.
329. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh ("Avoyelles Iii"), 715 F.2d 897, 925-26 (5th Cir.
1983).
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way to kill an aquatic plant is to remove the aquatic environment from around
the plant. 330 Pumping the hydrology from a wetland is certainly a "distur-
bance" to wetland vegetation. In terms of destructive power, the removal of
the hydrology from a wetland has a greater impact than merely removing the
vegetation. Since a wetland's vegetation and soil conditions are created by the
presence of water, artificial pumping eliminates the very capacity of a wetland
to support hydrophytic vegetation." ' In this way, an owner may remove the
water from the wetland, destroy the hydrophytic vegetation, and evade the
jurisdiction of section 404. To further the explicit policy that supports the
"under normal circumstances" factor, the Corps must treat these activities the
same. Consequently, a party who attempts to fill a previously drained wetland
must obtain a section 404 permit before doing so.
Failing to interpret the "normal circumstances" factor as requiring a section
404 permit before a previously drained wetland can be filled renders the defi-
nition of a wetland meaningless. Furthermore, such an interpretation creates
an unintended loophole in section 404. Correspondingly, such an interpretation
usurps Congress' articulated policy of protecting the nation's wetlands,"' and
the President's articulated "no net loss" policy.' 33 Therefore, future courts
must read the "normal circumstances" language as advocated by this Com-
ment. This approach represents a correct reading of the CWA and furthers
the underlying goals of the Act.
In sum, even if draining per se is not covered under the CWA, filling a
previously drained wetland requires a section 404 permit. The primary, al-
though not exclusive,334 argument to support such a conclusion comes from the
330. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text. Wetlands plants are specially adapted for
aquatic, anaerobic environments.
331. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
333. See Lavelle, supra note 24, at 24. President Bush made "no net loss" of wetlands one of
his many three-word campaign slogans in the 1988 presidential campaign. Id.
334. Congress should be cognizant of another, subsidiary argument that would compel a party
to obtain a permit before filling a previously drained wetland. This argument is also premised on
the definition of a wetland.
The definition of a wetland includes a requirement of inundation or saturation by surface or
ground water. See 40 C.F.R. 230(t) (1990). Saturation is, however, not required on a constant
basis. W. NIERING, supra note 2, at 21 (stating that "[m]ost wetlands are characterized by fluctu-
ating water levels"). A wetland is a transitional area between traditional water bodies and dry,
terrestrial land. Odum, supra note 43, at 422-23. Necessarily, wetlands are sometimes wet and
sometimes dry. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Alexander ("Avoyelles If"), 511 F. Supp. 278,
289 (W.D. La, 1981), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983). Therefore, were a wetland wet during the entire ecological
cycle, the area would be truly aquatic, and it would lose its classification as a wetland. See supra
notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing Avoyelles 11). In addition, the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service, in a report on the status of the nation's wetlands, concluded that most wet-
lands go through a period of relative dryness, and a wetland does not cease to be a wetland during
this period. WETLANDS TRENDS, supra note 28, at 11.
The EPA, the Corps, Congress, and the courts should recognize that the temporary draining of
a wetland may not change its protected, legal status under the CWA. An artificial de-watering
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definition of a wetland. In particular, a proper reading of the "normal circum-
caused by pumping or other de-watering technique is comparable to the natural fluctuation of
water which normally occurs on a wetland. See supra notes 96-107 (discussing the Federal Man-
ual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands and its definition of the water re-
quirement). Pump-induced drainage of a wetland may only bring about a dry period which is
normal for the hydrologic cycle of the wetland. Furthermore, the wetland vegetation capacity
requirement may not be destroyed by draining a wetland. 40 C.F.R. § 230(t) (1990). The capac-
ity of a wetland to support typical wetland vegetation is not characterized by the constant satura-
tion of the soil. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. Indeed, many plant species
found in a wetland require only a short period of saturation or inundation and can survive long
periods of dryness. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, 511 F. Supp. at 284 (listing many plant
species that can exist in wetlands for a significant periods of dryness); see also supra notes 96-101
and accompanying text (supporting the notion that wetland vegetation requires a certain dry por-
tion of the year). It is the capacity of the wetland to support wetland life forms that is of issue, not
its present state of dryness. The possibility remains, after a drainage, that the wetland may flood
again through ground water or rain, and thereby have the hydrology to support wetland life. See
supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (explaining that the water requirement can be satisfied
regardless of the source of water). Therefore, an artificial de-watering of the wetland merely sup-
plies a dry period and may not change the area's status as a wetland.
Even if a party engages in a sustained de-watering efforts and thereby destroys any possibility
of the area supporting wetland vegetation, a finding of wetland status is still possible if the Corps
examines the previous legal status of the now dried area. As a general rule, the Corps, in making
its wetland determination, will only look to the present situation and disregard the history of the
site under determination. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977) (noting that the Corps' "intent under sec-
tion 404 is to regulate discharges of dredged or fill material into the aquatic system as it exists,
and not as it may have existed over a record period of time").
The Corps, however, has made certain exceptions to this general rule. Most notably, the Corps
and the EPA make exceptions for those instances where a wetland is destroyed through clandes-
tine filling. See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON REGULATORY GUIDANCE LETTER 90-7: CLARIFICA-
TION OF THE PHRASE "NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES" AS IT PERTAINS TO CROPPED WETLANDS 7
(1990). In these situations, the owner of a wetland fills the area with material without a Corps
permit. After the fill is completed, the owner can claim that a wetland no longer exists, and the
Corps has no jurisdiction. In these instances, however, the Corps finds jurisdiction over the area by
investigating the area's status prior to the destructive fill. Id. Therefore, by examining the histori-
cal status of the previously filled site, the Corps prevents the blatant usurpation of the mandate of
the CWA.
This Comment contends that this historical approach should also be applied where a landowner
has pumped dry an area that was previously a wetland. The clandestine filling of wetlands is
sufficiently analogous to the draining of a wetland. Parties engage in both activities for one pur-
pose: the eventual development of a wetland free from federal regulation. Therefore, both prac-
tices must be regulated, instead of regulating only clandestine filling. Thus, this Comment con-
tends that once the Corps becomes aware that a wetland was destroyed due to pumping or
draining, it must investigate that area's status prior to the pumping to determine if a permit was
required to fill the area. If a permit was required and the party failed to obtain one before filling,
then the Corps must take appropriate remedial measures.
Investigating past and present alterations to wetland hydrology is critical for protecting the
nation's wetlands from destruction. If landowners and developers are allowed to avoid the CWA
by desiccating wetlands, a significant amount of wetland acreage will be lost to reclamation. As
more developers discover this unintended loophole in the CWA, the rate of wetland losses will
increase. The current annual rate of loss for wetlands in the United States is between 300,000 and
458,000 acres. See W. WANT, supra note 13, §2.01(4). Therefore, the "normal circumstances"
argument and others mentioned here are necessary to reestablish the mandate of the CWA-to
regulate pumping and filling activities on the nation's wetlands.
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stances" language in the regulatory definition compels such a conclusion.
C. Effect of Requiring Permits to Drain Wetlands or to Fill Previously
Drained Wetlands from a Policy Perspective
If a future court adopts either position advocated by this Comment, a num-
ber of important policy goals would be furthered. Specifically, either position
would further the express mandate of the CWA and the more general goal of
environmental conservation. Rendering the draining and filling scheme subject
to the jurisdiction of the CWA furthers the goal of restoring and maintaining
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. 335 Wet-
lands serve a variety of functions related to the conservation of the nation's
water supply. 3 6 -Without extensive protection of wetlands, the chances of ade-
quately maintaining water quality are substantially lowered.
Requiring a permit for draining and subsequently filling a wetland also pro-
motes conservation efforts. Wetlands are perhaps the most important ecologi-
cal resource in the United States. The survival of many species of plants and
animals, for example, depends heavily on the continued existence of wetland
resources." 7 Official recognition of the value of wetlands is widespread. Con-
gress, in the hearings on the bill which became the CWA, recognized the criti-
cal importance of wetlands to the environment.3 3 8 Additionally, in a policy
forum the EPA caused to convene, the forum members specifically recom-
mended special regulatory reform to allow the CWA to cover all wetlands
conversions which resulted from drainage and all other activities which are
allowed to escape regulation as a result of loopholes in the CWA.3" 9 In order
to fully implement the goals of clean water supplies and ecological safety, the
CWA must overcome the "discharge bias" which pervades the Act. Therefore,
to assure the sanctity of wetlands and other important policy goals, future
courts must interpret the CWA strictly, to regulate the draining and filling
scheme.
IV. IMPACT
A. A Change in Regulations and Guidelines Is Needed to Protect
Wetlands from Illicit Dewatering Activities
The arguments set forth in Save Our Community v. EPA340 and the Analy-
sis section of this Comment represent legitimate means by which future courts
335. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text. Wetlands serve to purify water, maintain
groundwater supplies and prevent flooding in many areas of the United States. Id.
337. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
339. W. WANT, supra, note 13, § 2.01[5] n.24 (citing NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM.
PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: AN ACTION AGENDA (1988) (on file at the offices of The
Conservation Foundation, 1250 Twenty-Fourth Street, Washington, D.C. 20037)).
340. 741 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
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can regulate draining activities. Administrative action, however, would re-
present the most efficient way to regulate future draining and filling activities
on wetlands. Specifically, the EPA and the Corps must modify the existing
regulatory scheme for wetlands. This amendment should include provisions
that directly regulate all discharges incidental to any drainage activity. Addi-
tionally, the regulatory modification should assert jurisdiction over those areas
which under normal circumstances exhibit all the attributes of a wetland, but
were drained of their moisture. This regulatory change must be expressed in
both the Corps' regulations and its regulatory guidance letters.""
1. Amending the Regulations Regarding Draining Activities
Modifications to the Corps' regulations are needed to reflect adequately the
need to regulate drainage activities. Initially, an addition is required to Title
33, section 323.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations. This section currently
explains which discharges require permits.-" 2 The regulatory amendment must
explicitly state that discharges incident to any draining activities require a per-
mit under section 404. For example, the addition to section 323.3(c) may read
as follows:
(c). Draining Activities Causing a Discharge . . . Discharges of dredged or
fill material into the waters of the United States incidental to any draining
activities require DA [Department of Army] permits.
In addition to this modification, all important new terms must be clearly
defined. Such clarification is necessary to avoid confusion over what consti-
tutes "draining activities." Since this phrase is new to the regulations, a defini-
tion of the phrase is needed in Title 33, section 323.2, which contains the
definitions of key terms. To be consistent with the rest of Congress' regulatory
program, the definition should read as follows:
Draining activities include the construction of any canal, ditch, dike or other
waterway and the placement of any mechanical pumping device which
drains or otherwise significantly modifies a water of the United States. The
term does not include minor drainage activities as defined in § 324 of this
Part.34'
Another addition is similarly needed, to avoid confusion over the minor
drainage exemption allowed for farmland. 4 4 This modification must limit the
341. The Corps' Headquarters grants a considerable amount of autonomy to the district engi-
neers and division engineers. See 33 C.FR. § 320.1(a) (1990). The regulations in the C.F.R. and
the RGL's are the primary means by which the Corps' Headquarters communicates to the 36
relatively autonomous districts and divisions.
342. See id. § 323.3.
343. The emphasized portion would be a new addition to the regulations. Including in the defi-
nition the phrase "and the placement of any mechanical pumping device" is critical to regulating
the type of actions taken by the defendant in Save Our Community and others who seek to avoid
the jurisdiction of § 404.
344. 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(iii)(C)(2) (1990). This section allows for minor drainage as long
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expanse of the minor drainage exemption. This subsection should mimic the
definition of draining activities as follows:
(2) . . .minor drainage in waters of the United States . does not include
the construction of any canal, ditch, dike or waterway or the placement of
any mechanical pumping device which drains or otherwise significantly
modifies a stream, lake, swamp, bog, or any other wetland or aquatic area
constituting waters of the United States.
These proposed additions and modifications are not intended to be all-inclu-
sive. However, they do adequately express the need to regulate all destructive
draining activities on wetlands. Therefore, the Corps should adopt modifica-
tions substantially similar to the ones advocated here.
2. Publication of Regulatory Guidance Letter to Clarify the Meaning of
"Normal Circumstances"
In addition to officially clarifying the Corps' position on draining, the Corps
should provide guidance regarding the "normal circumstances" language as it
relates to dehydrating a wetland.34 5 The best way to accomplish this would be
for the Corps to issue a new Regulatory Guidance Letter. 4"
The central thesis of this new Regulatory Guidance Letter should be to de-
fine more explicitly the phrase "normal circumstances" so as to enable the
Corps to retain jurisdiction over wetlands converted by illicit drainage activi-
ties. The letter should be in much the same form as RGL 86-9347 and RGL
90-7. 88 It could be entitled "Clarification of the Phrase 'Normal Circum-
stances' as It Pertains to Wetlands Altered Through Draining Activities."
Moreover, as with other guidance letters, preliminary paragraphs should state
the definition of a wetland and point out that past RGLs did not explicitly
deal with the situation of draining with the intent to avoid section 404 jurisdic-
tion. The most crucial paragraphs should set out the draining and filling prob-
lem and then explain the solution with regard to a clarification of the phrase
"normal circumstances." These paragraphs may read as follows:
1. Individuals in the past have engaged in dehydration techniques that are
designed to alter the hydrology of wetland areas in an attempt to avoid the
jurisdiction of section 404. Individuals first reduce the hydrology on a wet-
land through pumping or other draining techniques and kill the aquatic veg-
etation on the wetland. After completing this drainage process, these indi-
viduals seek a redetermination of the wetland's status under the CWA. Such
a process is intended to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Corps under sec-
tion 404.
as the character of the land is not changed. Id.
345. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1990); 40 C.F.R. § 230(t) (1990).
346. For two recent clarifications of the Corps' position, see Corps RGL No. 86-9, supra note
127; Corps RGL No. 90-7, supra note 129.
347. See RGL No. 86-9, supra note 127-28.
348. See RGL No. 90-7, supra note 129.
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2. In these situations, the Corps will continue to assert section 404 jurisdic-
tion. Artificial and purposeful drainage of a site, which under "normal cir-
cumstances" exhibits all the characteristics of a wetland, cannot change the
site's prior classification as a wetland. Determining whether an area qualifies
as a wetland "under normal circumstances" involves an evaluation of the
alteration of the wetland hydrology and hydrophytic vegetation, in addition
to the historical status of the area in question. Also fundamental to this
determination is an appraisal of the purpose and intent of the activity caus-
ing the alteration. As we stated with reference to alterations of the hydro-
phytic vegetation on a wetland: where the Corps can determine or reasona-
bly infer that the purpose of the physical disturbance to the hydrology was
to avoid regulation, the Corps will continue to assert jurisdiction. This is
merely a restatement of the existing policy of preventing the circumvention
of section 404 through the clandestine destruction of wetland hydrology and
hydrophytic vegetation.
This is an example of the type of regulatory guidance required to put an
official end to attempts to skirt the Corps' permit process through draining.
This two-part proposal to modify the Corps' regulatory program seeks to pre-
vent the unregulated destruction of wetlands. The two general modifications
advocated would serve as an explicit basis for prohibiting parties who wish to
drain the water out of a wetland from doing so without first obtaining federal
authorization.
B. The Impact on the Permit Process, Regulatory Agencies, and Wetlands
If the EPA and the Corps begin to actively regulate the destructive pump-
ing of water from wetlands, the impact for both wetlands and the regulatory
program will be substantial. Including de-watering techniques into the section
404 regulatory program will impact considerably on the permit process, the
agencies enforcing the CWA, and the protection of wetlands.
1. The Permit Process
If de-watering techniques are included into the scope of section 404, land-
owners would be significantly impacted. Landowners would be required to con-
tact the Corps before any de-watering for the purpose of converting a wet-
land.3 4 9 In addition to seeking a jurisdictional determination from the Corps
before conducting any pumping activities, 9 0 the landowner would be forced to
349. See Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 617 (N.D. Tex. 1990). The court
issued an injunction to prevent Waste Management from draining the wetlands located in Ferris,
Texas. Id. The injunction is to stay in effect until the Corps and the EPA "carry out their duty to
make a determination under § 404(b)." Id. Therefore, Waste Management must apply for a per-
mit to drain the wetlands.
350. See Ernst & Herring, supra note 80, at 844. The authors suggest that to "avoid confronta-
tion with the Corps or EPA, the developer must first determine whether jurisdictional wetlands
are located on the property." id.; see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1990) (defining wetlands); 40
C.F.R. § 230.3(c) (1990) (same).
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subject his project to a detailed review process.851 This review process could
include public hearings,8" 2 as well as reviews conducted by the Corps, the
EPA, and other agencies, including the United States Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and various state agencies. 35
The increase in applications for jurisdictional determinations will also signif-
icantly affect the review process itself. The Corps would be forced to deny
those permit applications which contain proposed de-watering activities that
are intended to destroy a wetland. With the increase in regulation will come
an increased need to find mitigation schemes to allow development without
any net loss of wetlands. The permit process, thus, will change from the rub-
ber stamp approval system of the Reagan era,354 to an equitable balancing of
environmental and developmental interests.
2. The Impact on the Agencies
In addition to the permit process, the agencies that enforce the CWA will
feel an impact if the coverage of section 404 is broadened. 55 The EPA, and
especially the Corps, may find that the increased coverage requires the addi-
tion of personnel to handle the extra applications. In this time of federal budg-
etary crisis, the impact of even a small increase, in agency duty could be
great.3 ' However, these increased costs will be offset by the decreased cost to
the judicial system. Strict enforcement by the Corps will make plaintiff suits
such as Save Our Community v. EPA unnecessary. Even more important are
the environmental and ecological savings that strict enforcement of the CWA
will cause.
3. Wetlands
Strict enforcement against destructive pumping will bestow profound bene-
fits upon the status of the nation's wetlands, environment, and ecology. Cur-
rently, wetland destruction continues in this country unabated. 57 Wetlands
are a precious natural resource, a resource that Congress intended to protect
through the enactment of the CWA. 58 Such protection is critical because wet-
351. See Ernst & Herring, supra note 80, at 844.
352. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 325(a)(5), 327 (1990) (establishing procedures for public hearings).
353. See id. § 320.4(c) (setting forth procedures for additional administrative review).
354. Lavelle, supra note 24, at 24 ("Wetlands criminal and civil enforcement, virtually stopped
during the Reagan years.").
355. Fundamentally, the Corps and the EPA will be affected proportionately according to their
roles in the enforcement of the wetlands protection. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1990). Since the
Corps serves more as the field operator, and the EPA as the promulgator of rules, the Corps will
bear the lion's share of extra investigations, analyses, and permit reviews caused by the extension
of the CWA.
356. Interview, supra note 171. The existing six-month backlog of permit applications would
grow longer, and an already overworked staff would be burdened further. Id.
357. See W. WANT, supra note 13, § 2.01(4). Between 300,000 and 458,000 acres of wetland
are lost every year. Id.
358. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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lands provide numerous ecological and biological benefits. 6 9 Therefore, addi-
tional protection for wetlands through orderly regulation is necessary and
justified.
The importance of wetlands can be further demonstrated by contemplating
what would occur if the Corps and the EPA continued to read the CWA as
not covering the dehydration of a wetland. It is highly likely that evasion of
the Corps' jurisdiction under section 404 would increase. Consequently, the
rate of wetland loss due to pumping would also increase. Such widespread
usurpation of the CWA is clearly unacceptable. As Judge Barefoot Sanders
said in Save Our Community v. EPA, "Congress did not intend the Clean
Water Act to serve landowners as both a sword to eliminate wetlands through
draining and a shield to then avoid a [section] 404(b) permit."3 60 Unfortu-
nately, once the mistake is made to allow such widespread destruction of wet-
lands, the solutions are few, and the chances for a sound environment
diminish.
V. CONCLUSION
Save Our Community v. EPA may prove to be a landmark decision in the
effort to preserve and restore the nation's wetlands. Indeed, the case may spur
the EPA and the Corps to amend their regulatory schemes so as to protect
more explicitly against the draining and filling scheme. Any amendments that
are made should mirror those advocated here. Until this regulatory modifica-
tion occurs, however, courts must stand ready to address the draining issue.
This Comment contends that future courts should adopt the ultimate conclu-
sion of the court in Save Our Community v. EPA. Future courts, however,
must not rely exclusively on the district court's reasoning. Rather, future
courts should rely on the textual and other arguments presented in this Com-
ment, as well as the district court's policy arguments. Such an approach would
provide sound reasoning, consistent with the mandate of the CWA, and pro-
mote a well-established and articulated national policy.
Kevin O'Hagan
359. See supra notes 26-35.
360. Save Our Community v. EPA, 741 F. Supp. 605, 615 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
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